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Economic Growth and Structural Change in South Asia: 
Miracle or Mirage? 
 
Executive Summary 
 
An assessment of recent economic growth 
 
Economic growth in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh, the three largest economies of 
South Asia, jumped from an average of 5 percent in the 1990’s to well above that in 
2000-2008.  Shortly before the onset of the global financial crisis in 2008, India’s growth 
rate was a staggering 9 percent and Pakistan, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka’s around 7 
percent. These growth rates were all the more impressive because they were accompanied 
by a substantial reduction in poverty. Over a 10 year period, poverty declined 10 
percentage points or more in India, Pakistan and Bangladesh. Even Nepal saw a decline 
in poverty of similar magnitude despites relatively weak economic growth because of 
political difficulties.  
 
The economic outcomes were remarkable considering that South Asia faced many of the 
development conundrums that countries in Africa had faced. India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 
had large fiscal deficits, all of South Asia but especially Bangladesh, ranked high on 
corruption indices, civil conflict raged in much of South Asia, Maldives and Bhutan 
showed syndromes of enclave economies and macro-economic instability threatened 
several countries. And yet, South Asia managed to overcome the constraints. Bangladesh 
provided exemplary social services by encouraging domestic NGO’s. Sri Lanka protected 
the Western Province from conflict and enabled it to enjoy the rewards of economic 
liberalization. Nepal opened up alternative, more lucrative, avenues of income earning 
via overseas migration. India kept a lid on inflation and interest rates despite the high 
fiscal deficits and Pakistan soared as soon as the credit crunch was relaxed in 2002.      
 
The encouraging outcomes on growth and poverty fuelled optimism regarding South 
Asia’s economic prospects. Growth scenarios ranged between the modest claims of 
meeting the millennium goals of human and economic development to the more self-
congratulatory chest-thumping about this being South Asia’s century.  These, on the one 
hand, translated into the laudable objective of reducing poverty to single digits within a 
decade, and on the other, to assertions that the ancient wisdom of the region would show 
a new path of development to the rest of the world.  
 
There were some lingering doubts, however. One was about growing regional inequality 
associated with the rapid growth of the previous decade. In India, seven states with per 
capita GDP less than the national average had income levels half those of the seven states 
with higher than national average GDP per capita. Population weighted average per 
capita GDP in the populous Indian states of Bihar and UP was about a third of the 
weighted average for the four southern states: Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh 
and Kerala. Even more alarming was the fact that the income gap between the richer and 
the poorer states was widening; the richer states were growing at twice the rates of the 
poorer states. In Pakistan’s Punjab, poverty incidence in the richer northern districts at 30 
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percent was considerably lower than in the poorer southern districts (40 percent). 
Furthermore, the significantly lower primary school enrolments in the southern districts 
(60 percent) compared to the northern districts (108 percent) implied that in the coming 
years regional income gap was likely to widen further.                  
 
Poor education outcomes give rise to other reasons to worry about sustaining Asia’s 
growth. South Asia’s gross education enrollment rates, average years of schooling, 
indicators of trainability of workers to enhance economy-wide productivity and 
international competitiveness are considerably lower than the East Asian countries (Sri 
Lanka being an exception). On infrastructure comparisons (for example, in electric power 
consumption per capita and container traffic), another driver of international 
competitiveness, also South Asia faired a lot poorer than East Asia.  These, in part, not 
only explain the much lower share of trade to GDP ratio in South Asia compared to East 
Asia, but also highlight the much smaller proportion of high technology products in 
South Asia’s merchandize exports compared to East Asia’s.  
 
 
Remittances and structural change 
 
Clearly, South Asia’s growth trajectory has been different from East Asia’s manufactured 
export-led growth. One important difference is that in East Asia, growth was foreign   
investment driven while in South Asia worker remittances have been the largest source of 
external flows into the region (15 percent of GDP in Nepal, 10 percent in Bangladesh and 
Sri Lanka and 4 percent and 3 percent respectively in India and Pakistan). In all South 
Asian economies remittances are considerably larger than the combined financial inflows 
associated with foreign investment and concessionary official assistance. 
 
Remittances have been a mixed blessing for South Asian economies. On the positive 
side, remittances have flown into depressed regions of South Asia and to the poorer 
households (for that is where migrants originate as they seek to improve living standards 
in employment overseas).  This is mainly why poverty has fallen sharply throughout 
South Asia, evenin Nepal whichexperienced low GDP growth rates due to political 
instability.  
 
On the other hand, remittances have fueled a massive consumption boom in South Asia. 
In the mid-2000’s the region ran up a trade deficit of $50 billion annually.  Associated 
with remittances and the bonanza in imported consumer goods has been the rapid growth 
of the domestic retail, financial services, telecommunications and construction activity.  
Put differently, the accumulation of reserves has prevented currency adjustments to wipe 
out the trade deficit. Instead, the adjustment has happened in terms of the evolving 
structure of the economy whereby services have become the dominant economic activity 
in South Asia. 
 
In East Asia, foreign investment driven and merchandize export-led growth resulted in a 
large number of workers moving from low productivity, low wage agricultural jobs to 
higher productivity, higher wage manufacturing jobs. The share of agriculture in national 
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GDP and employment fell while that of manufacturing increased. In South Asia, on the 
other hand, rapid growth up to 2008 resulted in decline of agriculture in the economy but 
an increase in the share of services in GDP while manufacturing has shown little 
dynamism in terms of capturing international markets and creating employment 
opportunities.  
 
South Asia’s services-led growth: a new growth paradigm? 
 
India’s modern services sector is often cited as the harbinger of a new South Asian 
services-led growth paradigm. The implication is that modern services will drive 
productivity and employment growth in South Asia. And services-led sustained high 
growth will enable the region to eventually join the rank of middle-income countries and 
reduce poverty to single digits.  
 
The composition of services in all South Asian economies has indeed improved with an 
increasing share of services now accounted for by “modern” services such as financial 
intermediation, communications and transport. This “splintering” of services made 
possible by information technology has created employment opportunities that are more 
productivity and command higher wages than employment in agriculture. This 
employment transition from agriculture to relatively modern services largely explains the 
recent high growth spurts in South Asian economies. 
 
The central question, and one attempted in this monograph, is whether this services-led 
transition in employment can result in long term sustained high growth. This, in turn, 
depends on whether consumption-led growth, fueled by remittances, will sustain 
productivity growth and create enough employment opportunities in the services sector to 
absorb most of the working poor in South Asia over the next three to four decades. The 
burden thus is on continued high demand for modern services by households receiving 
remittances from members working overseas. This derived demand for services is subject 
to considerable uncertainty. 
 
Alternatively, South Asia could export modern services in which case the South Asian 
growth paradigm is not all that different from East Asia’s. The growth stimulus still 
comes from international trade but trade would be in modern services rather than in 
manufactured goods. India’s recent phenomenal success in the export of IT services is 
cited as an example of how information technology enabled splintering of services has 
created a dynamic, internationally competitive growth node for the economy.   
 
India’s IT achievements are undoubtedly remarkable. Software production in India for 
the international market increased from US$1.1 billion in 1996-97 to US$23 billion in 
2006. India now accounts for 60 percent of global outsourcing. Bangalore, Chennai, 
Hyderabad and increasingly New Delhi are at the center of the global “unbundling of the 
production process” whereby the parent firm located in the developed country unbundles 
its spatial value chain by outsourcing over great distances. Rapid technological change in 
telecommunications has allowed the validation of predictions of new economic growth 
models centered around economic geography. 
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None of the other South Asian economies, however, has achieved India’s success in the 
export of computer and business services despite being as well endowed in terms of the 
enabling environment i.e. electrification rate, percentage of English speakers, broadband 
subscription etc. Furthermore, neither India nor the other South Asian economies have 
matched India’s success in export of computer and business services in any other modern 
service. 
 
In the context of the new South Asian services led growth paradigm, even India’s success 
in global outsourcing falls far short of what is needed.  Total employment in India’s IT 
sector is still a small fraction of India’s workforce. Growth in IT employment in the last 
decade does not promise the massive transition in the work force needed to sustain high 
transformational growth rates in the medium to long term.    
           
 
A sectorally balanced growth framework 
 
It is argued in this monograph that rather than being blind-sided by infatuation with South 
Asia specific growth paradigms, policy makers would do well to continue to give policy 
attention to all three sectors of the economy viz., agriculture, manufacturing and the 
services sector. Policy and institutional changes are needed in all three sectors, but 
especially in manufacturing, to reduce the glaring productivity gaps shown up in 
international comparisons. A sectorally balanced approach to development will ensure 
that growth is inclusive and resource efficient. This, in turn, will result in sustained high 
transformational growth in South Asia to reduce poverty to single digits and create a 
large and vibrant South Asian middle class.  
 
Services 
 
Services clearly have an important role in raising the overall productivity of the economy 
and thus contribute to sustained high growth. Demand side stimulus for productivity 
growth in most services (retail, transport, government services, banking etc) will come 
from income growth and to that extent services and income growth are inter-twined.   
 
Further splintering of services, as in the case of IT services in India, will be needed for 
economy-wide productivity boost but that will require modernizing services by 
addressing supply side bottlenecks. This will require: a) better economic integration of 
low and high growth regions within countries by improving the flow of labor and capital 
across regions; b) upgrading of the skills of the workforce since modern services are 
human capital intensive; this, in turn, will require improving the quality of and 
enrollment in secondary and tertiary education; c) deepening of the telecommunication 
infrastructure to facilitate intensification of IT enabled services in the domestic economy; 
d) attracting investment, especially foreign investment, in domestic services to improve 
business practices; e) improving the quality standards in services such as tourism, health 
and education to attract overseas users; and finally, f) taking a more forward looking 
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stance on liberalization of services in international foums to make South Asia an 
important player in the global market for services.                    
 
Agriculture 
 
However, services alone will not result in transformational growth rates.  In 2007, on 
average, nearly 70 percent of South Asians lived in rural areas and nearly a third of them 
fell below the poverty line. Since half of those employed were engaged in agriculture, 
improving agricultural productivity and international competitiveness must remain an 
important policy focus to achieve sustained income growth and poverty reduction 
objectives in South Asia.  
 
Agriculture’s international competitiveness is driven by crop yields and in most 
international comparisons, crop yields in South Asia are substantially below those in 
comparable countries. Wheat yields in India and Pakistan are half those in China. Even in 
comparison with countries with similar ecological conditions, such as Indian and 
Pakistani Punjab and irrigated Egypt, crop yields are substantially lower in South Asia. 
 
The rising trend in wheat and rice yields in India and Pakistan, but also other successful 
examples in South Asia, suggest however that considerable improvements in productivity 
and international competiveness are possible.   Bangladesh has strengthened food output 
that has helped reduce rural poverty and agricultural exports have responded well to 
policy reform. The Sri Lankan economy, in general, has responded well to policy reform 
but agriculture remains mired in a policy regime focused on autarky. In Nepal, oilseeds, 
potato, tobacco, sugarcane and jute yields increased significantly since 1991. 
Furthermore, South Asian farmers are beginning to find niches in potentially rewarding 
new crops. Examples are wine production in Maharashtra, India, and the export of 
Kinnow oranges from Sargodha, Pakistan. This evidence is indicative of the rich potential 
in South Asian agriculture.                
                      
The three critical challenges to realizing the agricultural potential are (i) water and land 
management, (ii) infrastructure development and crop research and (iii) intra-regional 
trade in agriculture. 
 
Keeping in view future water shortages, South Asian governments have begun to 
formulate water management strategies.  Government of Pakistan has produced a “Water 
Vision 2025” which is expected to increase water storage capacity by 64 million acre feet 
from the current 16 million acre feet. Water conservation that reduces the delivery losses 
through canals and water courses will increase water supply by 10-15 percent. The 
Government of Sri Lanka spent Rs 215 billion between 1980 and 1997 on irrigation 
infrastructure development including the Mahaweli River project and plans to do more. 
 
Poorly defined land rights and inefficient landholding mean that land cannot be used 
collateral in the credit market to spur investment in agriculture. This needs to be 
addressed, especially in Pakistan, to allow land to be put to more productive use. In Sri 
Lanka, most land was state owned and was later transferred to agricultural laborers via 
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deed registration. This has resulted in equitable holdings but the holdings are too small 
and the deeds do not repose full ownership to enhance credit worthiness. This has 
discouraged the switch to efficient farming techniques. 
 
Investment in infrastructure and research is essential to increase productivity of land. 
This includes farm-market roads, telecommunications, better functioning retail and 
wholesale markets and improved seeds. High yielding varieties are now being cultivated 
all over South Asia but recurrent problems such the mutation of pests to counter the 
immunity of genetically modified varieties requires that agricultural research stays 
abreast of field developments. This will require higher expenditure on research; the 
medium term target is an expenditure of 1-2 percent of GDP. 
 
South Asia regional trade in agricultural commodities is a meager 4 percent of world-
wide South Asia trade. India, by far the largest economy of the region, has the most 
protective agricultural trade regime. A lowering of trade barriers will result in a large 
increase in trade in agriculture and will spur agricultural productivity and incomes. With 
a more liberal trade regime for wheat and sugarcane, India and Pakistan would effectively 
manage their respective food security problems.                       
 
Manufacturing  
 
Increase in productivity in agriculture and services will contribute to sustaining high 
growth and reducing poverty to single digits in South Asia. However, it is manufacturing 
that has the potential to create employment opportunities across a broad spectrum of 
technical skills corresponding to South Asia’s workforce. Furthermore, export-led 
manufacturing creates investment and production linkages with potentially much larger 
and richer sources of world demand. This, in turn, generates opportunities for technical 
change in manufacturing that result in productivity and income growth for workers, and 
ultimately a transformational change in the economy.   
 
By all accounts, manufacturing has not been the engine of growth it should be to enable 
South Asia to move to middle income status. Over three decades, between 1968 and 
2001, manufacturing value added in Korea, Malaysia and Thailand increased by a factor 
of 40, 27 and 14 respectively. South Asian manufacturing, by contrast, was lackluster. In 
Pakistan, manufacturing value added in the same period increased by a factor of 7 and in 
India by a factor of 6. Furthermore, manufactures exports are dominated by one product 
group, textiles, despite that fact that the world demand for textiles is falling. Not 
surprisingly, therefore, the technology intensity of exports is low exposing South Asian 
products to intense competition from new entrants (e.g. Chinese textiles). The result is 
that employment in South Asia’s manufacturing has stagnated.   
 
It is encouraging that India is beginning to buck the South Asian trend in anemic 
performance in manufacturing. India’s share of technologically intensive exports in total 
merchandize exports is five times higher than Pakistan and Sri Lanka’s (but still six times 
lower than in China).  Indian manufactured exports are beginning to be diversified as 
seen in the rising share of Indian pharmaceuticals, chemicals, iron and steel and 
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automotive parts in the international market. This trend needs to be strengthened by 
attracting more investment, especially, foreign direct investment in manufacturing, 
India’s success will encourage other South Asian economies to emulate the example. 
 
The policy framework 
 
Attracting more investment in South Asian manufacturing will require addressing the 
overall policy framework that affects investment decisions. Key elements of that 
framework are: the exchange rate, credit allocation by banks, energy pricing, the quality 
of infrastructure, tax policies and labor market regulation. 
 
High currency values and build up of reserves in South Asia, despite chronically large 
trade gaps, is explained by the inflow of remittances. Thus remittances result in a much 
higher equilibrium exchange rate than would be the case otherwise. This, in turn, results 
in loss of international competitiveness and discourages investment in manufactured 
exports, a variant of the well-known Dutch disease problem. The solution does not lie in 
devaluing South Asian currencies since the exchange rate is in equilibrium, albeit at a 
high value. But in ensuring that the rest of policy framework does not reinforce the Dutch 
disease problem associated with the exchange rate. 
 
In varying degrees of success, South Asian economies have reformed their banking sector 
to intermediate more efficiently the large volumes of remittances inflows. None-the-less, 
Banks’ lending portfolios are dominated by consumption and personal loans as opposed 
to lending to manufacturing and production. 
 
Energy constitutes a significant cost of manufacturing. Its price and availability are thus 
important elements of competitiveness of manufacturing. The energy policy bias in South 
Asia is for protecting the residential consumer at the expense of manufacturing 
enterprises. The average power tariff paid by residential consumers in India, Pakistan, Sri 
Lanka and Nepal is substantially lower than that paid by industrial consumers. 
Furthermore, electricity rationing is more severe for manufacturing than for residential 
units. A similar bias is seen in the pricing and availability of natural gas.   
 
The policy preference for consumption continues in the design of tax policy. Despite the 
fact that services have grown the fastest in South Asia and now account for the larger 
share of the economy, the bulk of tax is generated in the manufacturing sector. 
Furthermore, in India and Pakistan, the corporate income tax rate, treated here as a proxy 
for tax on manufacturing, is substantially higher than personal and sales tax rates. (In 
Thailand and China, on the other hand, the personal income tax rate is substantially 
higher than the corporate rate). 
 
On infrastructure, the quality of passenger transportation, (railways and roads) is better 
and cheaper than the quality and cost of freight transport. Finally employment regulations 
inflict far greater employment rigidity on South Asian hiring enterprises compared to 
those in East Asia. 
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Addressing this broad policy framework is central to restoring competitiveness to 
manufacturing.      
 
 
Strengthening internal security to support growth  
 
Internal security poses serious challenges to South Asian economies and contributes to 
the loss of international competitiveness. Since the 1990’s, there has been a sharp 
increase in violent incidents in the region. Iraq over took South Asia briefly as a result of 
the insurgency following US invasion. However since 2007, South Asia is again the most 
violent region in the world.  In 1998, reported incidents of terrorist activity per capita 
were 0.6  and 0.7 per million in India and Bangladesh respectively.  In 2007, they 
increased to 0.9 per million in India but doubled to 1.4 per million in Bangladesh.  
Pakistan, with its raging insurgency in the Northwest and Sri Lanka, with an escalation in 
incidents related to the civil war in the Northeast, saw dramatic increase in terrorist 
activity. In Pakistan, such violence shot up by a factor of 8 from 0.3 per 100,000 persons 
in 1998 to 2.4 in 2007. In Sri Lanka, the increase in the same period was from 0.8 per 
100,000 to 1.8. The scale of increase in fatalities was similar.       
 
The causes of violence are varied. In India, violence is ascribed to separatist movements, 
land distribution disputes and religious bigotry.  In Bangladesh, violence has been 
spawned by religious fundamentalism and separatist movements. Sri Lanka has been 
subjected to virulent separatist violence and in Nepal its Maoist variety. Pakistan that has 
suffered the most in the region from internal insecurity is wracked by the religious/ethnic 
Pashtun insurgency in the North-West in sympathy with their cousins in Afghanistan and 
the separatist movement in Baluchistan.     
 
Regardless of the nature of the conflict and its various manifestations, violence adds to 
the complexity of economic management in the region. In Sri Lanka, the loss of income 
associated with violence is estimated at 2 percentage points of GDP per annum. In 
Pakistan, the direct and indirect cost of terrorist activity in the five years 2002-3 to 2007-
8, has been estimated at Rs 380 billion (US$4.5 billion). Furthermore, there is evidence 
that increase in violent incidents is negatively correlated with foreign direct investment 
and exports and positively correlated, as in Pakistan, with remittances (to compensate 
from shrinking economic activity) and concessionary external flows (from partners in 
war on terror).      
 
It appears therefore, that internal insecurity repels external flows that enhance 
international competitiveness (i.e. foreign direct investment) and attracts external flows 
(remittances and concessionary lending by donors) that retard international 
competitiveness, exacerbating the Dutch disease problem. In turn, this slows down 
productive employment generation that fuels insurgencies and internal insecurity. Thus, 
the arsenal for fighting terrorism must include a policy framework that corrects for these 
distortions and restores South Asia’s international competitiveness for sustained growth 
and employment generation.    
I. Introduction 
 
 
For nearly two decades, until the onset of global financial crisis in 2008, South Asian 
economies enjoyed rapid growth and an impressive reduction in poverty. This fueled 
optimism about sustained high growth in the coming decade and the possibility of single 
digit poverty by the end of the period. It was stressed that policy reform would need to 
continue to strengthen governance, improve the business climate, upgrade education and 
attract investment in infrastructure. The fundamental growth paradigm, however, was 
deemed to be working well1.  
 
This paper re-examines the evidence on economic performance in South Asia and arrives 
at a different, more sobering, conclusion.   
 
The rapid growth of South Asian economies in the last couple of decades has coincided 
with a surge in remittances.  Although domestic remittances are substantial, it is 
remittances from nationals working abroad that have made the greatest impact on the 
economies. They constitute by far the largest form of external financial flows into South 
Asia and their impact on the balance of payments and the exchange rate is significant. 
They have also helped reduce poverty and improve income distribution. Importantly, they 
have spurred a huge consumption boom in the region.  
 
South Asian economies have undergone a major structural change in the period 
coinciding with the surge in remittances and the consumption boom.  The share of 
agriculture in the economy has fallen sharply.  Manufacturing’s share has increased but 
only modestly. Services, on the other hand, have soared and have now become the 
dominant sector in all of South Asia. 
 
This structural change has profound implications for people employed in various sectors 
of the economy and their ability to climb out of poverty. The principal question to ask is 
whether this structural shift results in people moving from low to higher productivity and 
higher wage employment and whether this trend can be sustained over the next three to 
four decades. 
 
This, in turn, raises questions about whether such a structural shift is accompanied by 
increase in international competitiveness of the economy. This is critical to generate 
international demand for the region’s products to sustain high economic growth. This 
approach to thinking about development is influenced by the experience of East Asian 
economies that successfully tapped into international demand, thereby sustaining growth 
in worker productivity and wages for several decades. Such sustained international 
“vents” for growth were central to the region’s transformation from low to the middle 
income status.   
 
                                                 
1
  Shanta Devarajan and Ijaz Nabi, Economic Growth in South Asia: Promising, Un-equalizing, 
Sustainable?, Economic and Political Weekly,  August 19, 2006. 
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Part I of the monograph reviews the principal economic trend in the South Asia. Chapter 
II reviews the achievements and the vulnerabilities associated with South Asia’s recent 
growth experience.  Chapter III examines the trends in remittances, the accompanying 
consumption boom and the impact this has on the structure of South Asian economies. 
Part II focuses on sectoral issues that affect productivity and growth outcomes in the 
region highlighting the salient policy issues. Chapter IV reviews progress in the services 
sector and identifies the challenges in sustaining the international competitiveness of 
South Asians services. Chapter V does this for Agriculture and Chapter VI for 
manufacturing. The discussion on manufacturing critically examines the policy 
framework embedded in the region’s development strategy that has retarded the growth 
of manufacturing.  
 
Most of South Asia is deeply affected by internal security problems. Major insurgencies 
are raging in nearly all the countries. Thus no discussion of South Asia’s economic 
outcomes and prospects is complete without a review of internal security and how it 
impacts economic performance. This is done in the Appendix to contextualize the 
assessments presented in the monograph.   
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Part I:  Growth, Remittances and Structural Change in 
South Asia 
 4
     
 
II.   Recent economic growth in South Asia 
 
 
South Asian Growth Trends 
 
In the 1990’s, South Asia’s economic average annual GDP growth ranged between 4 
percent (Pakistan) and 5.5 percent (India). Other than in Pakistan, that experienced severe 
balance of payments difficulties in the 1990’s and the consequent disruption in economic 
performance, these growth rates were substantially higher than the respective countries’ 
historical rates. In India, in particular, the growth spurt in the 1990’s generated much 
interest as it was seen to have allowed India to finally break out of the confines of the so 
called, “Hindu” growth rate of 3-4 percent.   
 
The following six years (2001-2006) further strengthened the trends of the 1990’s. The 
growth in India for the period jumped by 2 percentage points to 7.5 percent  Pakistan too 
shook off the doldrums of the 1990’s and experienced growth rate of 5.5 percent and 
higher and Bangladesh further consolidated its growth. Bhutan, a small economy, saw the 
most impressive increase in growth from 5 percent to nearly 8 percent. On the other hand, 
Sri Lanka and Nepal saw growth falter. In Nepal, growth fell to 3.5 percent from a 
respectable 5 percent in the 1990’s. Sri Lanka also saw a weakening of growth from just 
above 5 percent in the 1990’as to 4.5 percent in the latter period. Both Nepal and Sri 
Lanka were affected by seemingly intractable and vicious insurgencies. 
 
Optimism about continued high growth in South Asia received another boost in 2006. 
India’s growth rate jumped to the dizzying heights of 9 percent, Bhutan’s to 8 percent, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka’s to over 7 percent and Bangladesh close to 7 percent. Only Nepal 
continued to falter due to increased political uncertainty.  
 
A particularly promising aspect of South Asian economic growth in the 1990’s was the 
impressive reduction in poverty (Figure 2). Other than in Pakistan, where growth was 
disrupted by the balance of payments crises in the 1990’s (see box 1 below), and in Sri 
Lanka, due to the intensification of the ethnic conflict, most of South Asia experienced 
poverty reduction of 1 percent per annum or more.  
 
Thus it appeared that South Asia had finally arrived at the right formula for managing 
their economies. Not only was growth high and sustained, it was also reducing poverty. 
The stage was thus set for a spate of reports/papers predicting a future of prosperity for 
the region. 
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Figure II-1 
       Source: World Development Indicators2008 
             
              
Figure II-2 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008
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Figure II-3 
 
Figure 2: Poverty (head count index) in South Asia is 
declining, more so in recent years 
58.8 
36.0 
41.76 
26.1 26.1 
49.8 
26.0 
30.9 32.1 
22.7 
0 
10 
20 
30 
40 
50 
60 
70 
Bangladesh India Nepal Pakistan Sri Lanka 
Around 1990 
Latest
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Sustainable?”  
  
Explaining South Asia’s Growth 
 
South Asian surprises 
 
South Asian growth has been explained in terms of overcoming the binding constraints to 
growth in other contexts and showing how the region overcame them (Shanta Devarajan, 
“South Asian Surprises”, EPW, August 2005).  The binding constraints identified by 
researchers that have retarded growth in Africa are corruption (Nigeria saw a decline in 
per capita income as a consequence, Kaufmann, 2002), civil conflict (that retarded 
growth by 2-3 percentage points, Collier and Hoeffler, 2003), macroeconomic instability 
(as reflected in high fiscal deficits, Fischer 1993, Ames et al 2003), reliance on enclave 
natural resources (Gelb, 1988, Auty and Mikell, 2000) and the fixed exchange rate in the 
CFA zone (Devarajan and de Melo, 1991).  
Devarajan argues that “For each of these growth-retarding factors, South Asia—the only 
other low-income region in the world—appears to have a counter example.” On 
corruption, Bangladesh, declared by Transparency International to be the most corrupt 
country in the world, has grown at 5 percent a year, with per-capita GDP growing at over 
3 percent.  Its GDP growth rate has been accelerating at one percentage point per decade 
over the last three decades.  
On conflict, Sri Lanka has had a civil war for the last twenty years during which its per-
capita GDP grew at over 3 percent a year.  On high fiscal deficits, India, has had a fiscal 
deficit of 10 percent of GDP for the last twenty years, during which its GDP grew at 6 
percent.  As for the natural resource curse, the Maldives’ tourism industry leases out 
islands to tour operators, employs foreign labor, and uses imported materials, and yet the 
 7
country has averaged 9 percent GDP growth over the past two decades, with per-capita 
GDP tripling to $2,300. Finally, on fixed exchange rates, Bhutan, a tiny kingdom of 
about 600,000 people, has a fixed exchange rate with India, a country of over a billion 
people and yet has grown at 6.6 percent, with per capita GDP growing at 4.4 percent. 
The explanation as to why South Asia has over come the “binding constraints” requires 
going beyond conventional macroeconomics. In Bangladesh, the non-state sector has 
stepped up to provide basic services such as education and the private sector has provided 
entrepreneurial stimulus (textiles). In Sri Lanka, almost all of the growth during the 
conflict period occurred in one province--the Western Province, the region around 
Colombo that took advantage from trade reform and the country’s high literacy rate. In 
Nepal, the dramatic reduction in poverty comes mainly from a sharp increase in 
remittances, which in turn is due to an increase in migration to India, and now to the 
Middle East.  India, despite fiscal deficits of 10 percent of GDP and debt-to-GDP ratio of 
nearly 90 percent, kept inflation and interest rates low, and growth was a healthy 8.5 
percent last year.  For the last two puzzles, namely why Maldives has not succumbed to 
the natural resource curse, and why Bhutan grows rapidly despite a fixed exchange rate, 
we can only speculate in the absence of any analysis.  Unlike some of the African 
countries, Maldives has a homogenous population, with a single ethnicity, language and 
religion.  This could have helped create a sense that everyone shared in the tourism 
sector’s prospects.  Bhutan’s largest trading partner and aid donor is India and this has 
minimized the distorting effects of the fixed exchange rate. 
Trying to make sense of all this, Devarajan argues…. “Clearly something is going on in 
South Asia. There has been substantial policy reform in South Asia.  The pace of reforms 
has been slow but steady.  As one observer puts it, South Asian policymakers “only chew 
what they can swallow.”  There have been very few policy reversals in South Asia 
(unlike Africa).  And the sequencing of reforms has been reasonable—most probably by 
accident, not by design.  One reason for this is that India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka are 
established democracies.  Policies are formulated by consensus.  The process is slow, but 
the outcomes are more durable. 
The reforms have paid off better than expected in the sense that the underlying 
governance problems, conflicts, and macroeconomic imbalances would normally be 
expected to retard growth, as they have in Africa.  It appears as if the people of South 
Asia have found ways of getting around these problems by seeking other ways of 
growing and reducing poverty, as with migration in Nepal, using NGOs in Bangladesh or 
concentrating on the industrial southwest in Sri Lanka. 
 
Rosy Predictions  
 
Devarajan and Nabi (Economic Growth in South Asia: Promising, Unequalizing, 
Sustainable?, EPW August 19, 2006) assessed South Asia’s growth performance in detail 
and constructed optimistic scenarios about future growth and poverty outcome 
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trajectories. They asserted that if South Asia’s growth accelerates to 10 percent a year, 
the region could see single digit poverty rates by 2015. 
 
Figure II-4 
Income per capita would increase substantially with 7% and 10% GDP growth 
rates 
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Figure II-5 
Poverty would reduce substantially with 7% and 10% Growth rates
 
Figure 4: Poverty reduction in South Asia associated with targeted growth rates 
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To be fair, Deverajan and Nabi had identified the challenges that need to be addressed to 
sustain high growth.  The two greatest challenges are (i) addressing the disparity in 
regional growth, (ii) strengthening the manufacturing sector and (iii) the much needed 
catching up on education and infrastructure deficits.  
 
By the early 2000’s, the evidence on intra-regional income disparity was beginning to 
mount in both India and Pakistan.  These two largest federations in South Asia would be 
politically vulnerable to growth strategies that resulted in large differences across regions. 
In India, the difference in income per capita in the seven states below the national 
average and the seven above it was large (Fig II-5).  It was feared that given the 
substantially higher growth rates of the richer seven states, this gap would increase 
further in the years to come.  This could pressure on the Indian and could well result in 
erosion of political support to pursue pro-growth reform. This argument gained strength 
from the fact that there was a regional correspondence (North-South divide) that could 
further accentuate the political vulnerability.   
 
 
Figure II-6 
Source: Devarajan and Nabi (2006): “Economic Growth in South Asia: Promising, Unequalizing, 
Sustainable?” 
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Southern Punjab that is violently challenging the political-economic framework of the 
state.    
 
Figure II-7   
Rising regional inequality; 
Pakistan’s Punjab province
 
Figure 7: Pakistan’s Punjab shows that there are significant variations in 
economic outcomes  even within sub-national regions  
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The second challenge identified by Shanta and Nabi, one that spurred the research 
presented in this monograph, was rooted in the structural weaknesses of the 
manufacturing sector in South Asia. Compared to East Asia, South Asian growth of 
manufacturing was much weaker and its export performance, in particular, was 
unimpressive. 
 
The three decades spanning 1968-1997 was the period of miracle growth in East Asia. 
This is best captured in the substantial increase in manufacturing base of those 
economies. In South Korea, manufacturing value added increased by a factor of 40, in 
Malaysia by a factor of 27 and in Thailand by a factor of 17. Meanwhile, Pakistan and 
India in South Asia saw much smaller (multiples of 7 and 6 respectively) expansion of 
manufacturing. 
 
South Asia’s international competitiveness in manufacturing, best measured in term of 
technology intensity of manufacturing exports, was also unimpressive compared to East 
Asia. High technology content of Indian and Pakistani manufacturing exports, at 5 
percent or less of total such exports, was well below that of East Asian economies’ that 
ranged between 25-35 percent by the mid - 2000’s.  Figure II-8 brings this out clearly. 
Resource based exports dominated the export consignments from both East and South 
Asian economies compared to medium and high technology export content. By the year 
2000, resource based content of export had declined sharply in East Asian economies but 
remained important in Pakistan and India. On the other hand high technology content 
increased sharply in East Asia but only marginally so in India, and not at all in Pakistan. 
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Although the challenges of weak international competitiveness default were recognized, 
Shanta and Nabi argued that South Asia should stay on course on the overall policy 
framework but should take corrective action as and where needed.  The overall message 
regarding growth thus was one of optimism. South Asia’s growth prospects and the 
regions’ ability to reduce poverty to single digits in a decade were endorsed as an 
achievable objective.    
 
FigureII-8 
Is High Growth in South Asia Sustainable? II: 
Obstacles that might become the next binding constraints;
Deficiency of skilled workers
Figure 11: Trainability attributes of w orkers in South and East Asia
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Figure II-9 
Is High Growth in South Asia Sustainable? II: 
Obstacles that might become the next binding constraints;
Insufficient power and port facilities
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Figure II-10 
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 Source: World Development Indicators 2008 
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Figure II-11 
11
Source: World Development Indicators 2008 
 
 
Weak performance of manufacturing may well be the outcomes of poor outcomes in 
education and infrastructure. As seen in secondary school enrollment and number of 
years of formal education, South Asian workers were less prepared for training required 
in skill intensive jobs than their East Asian counterparts. South Asia also lagged behind 
in energy consumption and port facilities.     
 
 
Growth Sustainability and Economic Structures  
  
Well before the onset of the global financial crisis and slow down in growth across the 
globe some observers, while agreeing that South Asia was beginning to emerge out of the 
slow growth trap, began to raise concerns about overly optimistic scenarios of sustained 
high growth in South Asia.   
 
Given its size, India naturally dominates South Asian averages. Shankar Acharya, a sharp 
observer of India’s growth performance and prospects, has identified strengths and 
weaknesses of the Indian economy in two important pieces of work2.  Contrasting his 
view with the more optimistic ones expressed in two previous studies on Indian growth 
                                                 
2
 Shankar Acaharya, “Essays on Macroeconomic Policy and Growth in India”, Oxford University Press, 
New Delhi, 2006. 
Shankar Acharya, Isher Judge Ahluwalia, KL Krishna, and Illa Patnaik, Economic Growth in India, 1950-
2000, in Kirist S. Parikh (edited), “Explaining Growth in South Asia”, Oxford university Press, New Delhi,  
2006    
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prospects3, he argues that much remains to be done for Indian growth to jump to 7 
percent or more on a sustained basis. He arrives at this conclusion after a careful review 
of the underlying structural factors that will determine growth viz., weaknesses in the 
labor and capital markets, institutional decay, lukewarm commitment to reform, fiscal 
stress, anemic performance of agriculture and growing intra-regional disparities. These 
conclusions are similar to those of Devarajan and Nabi expressed in the broader South 
Asia context. 
 
Taking a somewhat different approach, and similar to one in this paper, Arvind 
Panagariya4 has questioned the sustainability of India’s rapid economic growth without 
addressing the institutional and policy bottlenecks that have stunted the growth of 
manufacturing the sector that has the ability to absorb a large number of workers 
promises at different levels of skills. 
 
The collapse of Pakistan’s growth in 2008, following the heady high growth years of 
2002-2007, is a good example of how growth cannot be sustained without addressing the 
core structural weaknesses of the economy. The fact that manufacturing exports remained 
weak throughout the period of rapid growth was symptomatic of the balance of payments 
crisis that Pakistan faced in 20085.   
 
To better understand this discomfort with growth sustainability routed in the evolving 
structure of the economy, it is instructive to review a successful case of sustained 
economic growth and how the underlying structure of the economy evolved to support 
such growth.  
 
In East Asia, sustained economic growth was the outcome of a large number of workers 
moving from low productivity poorly paid rural and informal sector jobs to more 
productive urban jobs. Such movement happened over three to four decades. What 
sustained this transformation in East Asia was its export oriented manufacturing sector. 
Investment in East Asian manufactures received a sharp boost after the signing of the 
Plaza accord. This resulted in Japan shifting its electronics manufacturing base to East 
Asia to take advantage of low wage but increasingly educated (and therefore productive) 
workers to export to the developed world. Such FDI (initially from Japan but 
subsequently also from the US and Europe) created a large demand for East Asian 
manufactures exports in rich developed markets. This, in turn, created the demand for 
East Asian workers in manufactures exports and thus facilitated their move from low 
productivity, low wage jobs to high productivity, high wage jobs. Furthermore, robust 
growth and improving living standards in the western destinations allowed improvement 
in the quality of East Asian manufactures. This increased productivity in East Asia and 
higher wage jobs for East Asian workers.  
                                                 
3
 Vijai Kelkar, “India: On the Growth Turnpike”, 2004. Narayanan Orientation, Australian National 
University, April, available at http://rspas.anu.edu.au/papers/narayanan/2004oration.pdf. 
Dani Rodrik and Arvind Subramanian, 2004, “Why India can Grow at 7 percent a Year or More’, 
Economic and Political Weekly, vol. XXXVIII, No. 16, pp.1591-6 
4
 Arvind Panagaria, Transforming India, in “Sustaining India’s Growth Miracle”, Columbia University 
Press,  2008., 
5
 Ijaz Nabi, Dawn Article, 2008 
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The economic structure consistent with this virtuous cycle of East Asian growth was one 
where agriculture’s share in the economy was declining and that of manufacturing 
increasing.  The principal driver of growth and structured change was foreign direct 
investment (Thailand, Malaysia, China) and foreign borrowing (Korea, Thailand).  
 
It would be useful to see how the structural composition of South Asian economies has 
evolved and whether this is consistent with sustained high economic growth and 
improved employment opportunities as in East Asia.  
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III:  Soaring Remittances, Consumption Boom and Changing Economic 
Structure 
 
 
Remittances and Their Impact 
 
Uneven development of different regions is a basic fact of all South Asian economies. 
This is due to natural factors such as land quality, rainfall and other climatic features but 
also because of strategic choices in public investment such as the canal irrigation projects 
in the colonial period and subsequently.  
 
This uneven income earning opportunity has contributed to significant internal migration 
in South Asia throughout the centuries and a flow of remittances associated with it.   A 
rich popular culture of language, ballads and epics has been spawned by this two way 
flow. In Nepal, remittances receiving families are called “Lahoras” because in the British 
colonial periods the payments center for Nepali non-commissioned officers employed in 
the British army was located in Lahore now in Pakistan. In the Punjab, many folk songs 
speak of the tradeoff between income from remittances and the pain of parting. 
 
Even though remittances and migration have been important part of South Asia 
economies for a long time, their scale, and therefore the development impact, has taken 
on a new significance in the last three decades because of migration to much richer 
markets overseas. 
 
Although remittances constitute only 3 percent of GDP in South Asia overall, they are 
huge in Nepal (15 percent) and Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (10 percent). Significantly, for 
the region as a whole, remittances constitute the largest source of external finance, having 
outgrown Official Development Assistance and FDI combined. 
 
While remittances have provided a stabilizing cushion of international reserves to South 
Asian economies and have helped lower poverty in the less developed sub-regions, they 
have also fueled high import of consumption goods, and have allowed the economies to 
sustain much larger trade deficits than would otherwise be possible. Collectively, South 
Asia ran up a trade deficit of $ 50 billion in the mid 2000’s.  
 
 
Impact on consumption, inequality and poverty 
 
Remittances are private, non-market income transfers by millions of individuals and are 
best analyzed through the economics of the family.  The relationship between the migrant 
and the family is characterized by altruism, so that the utility of the migrant depends on 
the utility of his family members at home. Defining motives as altruistic implies that 
remittances will be sent in order to help family avoid hardships associated with a poor 
economy or bad luck. Simply put, remittances are compensatory transfers, which smooth 
out consumption of remitting workers’ families in recipient economies.  
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At 3.6 percent in the period 1995-2004, the average of all developing countries ratio of 
worker remittances to GDP (Chami et al, 2008)6, thus is an important source of 
consumption smoothing. The evidence from Latin America (Fanzylber and Lopez, 2008)7 
suggests that remittances help lower poverty and income inequality. Remittances also 
result in larger consumption of consumer durables by receiving households. Other studies 
(Stark & Levhari, 1982; Ahlburg, 1991) also stress the consumption enhancing 
consequences of remittances. 
 
In South Asia Jongwanish reports that a 10 percent increase in remittances leads to a 
2.8% reduction in measures of poverty suggesting that remittances can directly increase 
income of the poor and help smooth household consumption.  
 
As reported above, in several South Asian economies the ratio of remittances to GDP is 
substantially higher than the world-wide country average and therefore the economic 
impact is likely to be significantly larger.   
 
 
Impact on poverty    
 
 
Bangladesh: 
 
Bangladesh has seen impressive reduction in poverty incidence8 from 57 percent in the 
early 1990’s to 49 percent in 2000 and then declining rapidly to 40 percent in 2005. 
Improvements were made on several MDGs, such as gender parity in primary and 
secondary schooling, child mortality, access to sanitation and the quality of housing in 
rural areas. This was made possible by a stable and robust GDP growth rate of above 5 
percent between 2000 and 2005. Other contributing factors were reduced fertility rates 
that lowered the dependency ratio, greater participation by women in the labor force due 
to improvement in education, and rapid urbanization and increased productivity as people 
moved from farm to non-farm employment. A key factor was the substantial increase in 
remittances. However, challenges remain. The Eastern region (Sylhet, Dhaka, 
Chittagong) that has better connectivity and has been a substantial beneficiary of 
remittances has experienced a faster reduction in poverty than the Western region 
(Rajshahi, Barisal and Khulna) which is separated by a large body of water.  
Furthermore, the poor remain vulnerable to shocks such as floods and cyclones and the 
steep rise in food prices.    
 
                                                 
6
 Ralph Chami, Adolfo Brajas, Thomas Cosimani, Connel Fullenkamp, Michael Gapen and Peter Montiel, 
2008, Macroeconomic Consequences of Remittances, IMF Occasional Paper No. 259 (Washington: 
International Monetary Fund)  
7
 Pablo Fanzylber and J Humberto Lopez (edited), “Remittances and Development: Lessons from Latin 
America”, The World Bank, Washington DC.   
8
 “Poverty Assessment for Bangladesh: Creating Opportunities and Bridging the East-West Divide”, 
Bangladesh Development Series, Paper no. 26, Poverty Reduction, Finance and Private Sector 
Development Unit, South Asia Region, The World Bank, Dhaka, October 2008. 
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Nepal: 
 
Nepal experienced remarkable reduction in poverty and improvement in human 
development between 1998 and 2003, despite conflict and overall poor economic 
performance9.  The incidence of poverty in this period fell from 42 to 31 percent, and 
health and education outcomes improved, particularly for girls and people living in 
remote poor areas.  This is attributed mainly to macroeconomic stability, higher 
agricultural wages, increased connectivity, greater urbanization and decline in the 
dependency ratio. The most important factor, however, was remittances that increased 
sharply from 3 percent of GDP in 1995-96 to 12 percent in 2003-04. More than one 
million Nepalese work abroad, mostly in India but an increasing number goes to the 
Persian Gulf and East Asia. Increased remittances accounts for up to 50 percent of the 
reduction in poverty. However, poverty incidence among families of rural wage workers, 
who do not benefit from remittances, remains high. Furthermore, poorly connected 
Western regions continue to have substantially higher poverty incidence (45 percent in 
mid-Western region and 41 percent in the far Western region). 
 
 
Pakistan: 
 
The incidence of poverty in Pakistan10 is highly sensitive to overall economic growth. In 
1998-99, following nearly a decade of slow growth, the incidence of poverty was 
estimated at 31.1 percent. This deteriorated to 34.5 percent in 2000-01 as the economy 
continued to experience slow GDP growth. The events of September 11, 2001 prompted 
a restructuring of Pakistan’s external debt and triggered additional external flows both in 
the form of remittances through official channels and also concessionary finance from 
donors. This alleviated the credit crunch and resulted in robust growth for the next 7 
years. As a consequence, poverty fell sharply to 23.9 percent in 2004-05 and 22.3 percent 
in 2005-06.  The reduction of 12 percentage points in poverty incidence in 6 years is 
attributed to the clustering effect: a large proportion of the population is clustered around 
the poverty line so that in times of slow growth a large number of people slip back into 
poverty while sustained high income growth has the opposite effect.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
9
 “Resilience Amidst Conflict: An Assessment of Poverty Reduction in Nepal, 1995-96 and 2003-04”, 
Central Bureau of Statistics, National Planning Commission Secretariat, Government of Nepal, September 
2006.  
10
 Pakistan Economic Survey, various years 
 19
Impact on economic growth11 
()12 
 ….. via the labor market 
 
Remittances can lead to higher private expenditure on education and health by the 
receiving households resulting in greater human capital and therefore higher economic 
growth. However, such investments can also encourage further out-migration reducing 
the beneficial impact on remittance receiving country.  Furthermore, remittances can 
result in higher preference for leisure and therefore may reduce participation in the labor 
force. Chami, Gapen and Cosimano (2006)13 show this to be the case using a dynamic 
general equilibrium.  Kozel and Alderman (1990)14 find a significant negative impact of 
remittances on labor force participation of males in Pakistan.         
 
…..via the capital market 
 
The argument is that remittances improve the credit worthiness of households (domestic 
investors) which lowers the cost of capital in the remittance receiving economy and 
therefore increases the volume of investment. Furthermore, remittance flows may lower 
macro-economic instability which improves the investment climate in the receiving 
economy and thus encourages investment. This assumes, of course, that remittances are 
received by households who are investment constrained. However, given their 
compensatory nature, remittances go to households with high marginal propensity to 
consume. Also, if perceived to be permanent, household consumption will rise so that the 
impact on investment may be small.      
 
 
…… via competitiveness and total factor productivity 
 
The economy may become less efficient in the use of capital because of remittances if 
they are disguised capital inflows that go to households less well-positioned for making 
efficient investment choices compared to other financial intermediaries.  
 
Importantly, there is considerable evidence that remittances result in appreciation of the 
equilibrium exchange rate (Acosta, Lartey and Mandelman, 200715, and 200816, Montiel, 
                                                 
11
 The discussion here is based on an excellent survey of the theoretical and empirical issues surrounding 
remittances in a recent IMF paper (Barajas et al, 2009)12 
12
 Adolfo Barajas, Ralph Chami, Connel Fullenkamp, Micahel Gapen and Peter Montiel, “Do Worker 
Remittances Promote Economic Growth”, IMF working Paper, WP/09/153, International Monetary Fund, 
Washington, 2009. 
13
 Ralph Chami, Thmoas F. Cosimanio and Michael T. Gapen, 2006, “Beware of Emigrants Bearing Gifts: 
Optimal fiscal and Monetary Policy in the Presence of Remittances, “ IMF working paper 06/61 
(Washington: International Monetary Fund).  
14
 Valerie Kozel and Harold Alderman, 1990, “Factors determining work force participation and labor 
supply decisions in Pakistan’s Urban Areas”, Pakistan Development Review, Vol.29, pp.1-18.  
15
  Acosta, Pablo A., Emmanuel K.K.Lartey, and Frederico Mandelman, 2007, “Remittances, Exchange rate 
Regimes and the Dutch Disease,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper No. 2008-08 (Atlants: 
Federal Reserve Bank). 
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200817). Also known as the Dutch disease problem, this impact of remittances on the 
recipient economy can be deleterious to the manufacturing sector that has the potential 
for generating employment and beneficial technological externalities.   
 
The political economy affects of remittances can also be far reaching. Dependence on 
income outside the national economy reduces the incentive to monitor economic 
management performance of governments. Remittances also constitute resources for 
corruption thereby eroding recipient country institutions (Abdih, 2008)18.      
 
The survey of theory shows that although there are conditions in which remittances can 
have a beneficial impact on economic via capital accumulation, the impact may also be 
negative. Furthermore, the economy may well become less efficient in the way its use of 
national resources, and therefore less competitive, because institutions and policy 
decision making may deteriorate.  
 
Given that theory is inconclusive, what can be learnt from a survey of empirical findings?  
Using panel data from 84 countries in the period 1970-2004 and applying sound 
estimation techniques, Barajas et al (2009) conclude as follows:       
 
“The findings of this paper echo the recent criticism of foreign aid presented by Rajan 
and Subramanian (2005) and others, who point out that there is very little evidence that 
decades of official transfers have contributed much to growth of developing economies. 
Similarly, our findings suggest that decades of private income transfers----remittances---
have contributed little to economic growth in remittance receiving economies and may 
have even retarded growth in some. We find that when remittances are properly 
measured, and when the growth equations are well specified and instrumented, we cannot 
find a robust and significant positive impact of remittances on long-term growth, and 
often find a negative relationship between remittances and growth.”     
 
                                                                                                                                                 
16
  Acosta, Pablo A., Emmanuel K.K.Lartey, and Frederico Mandelman, 2007, “Remittances, Exchange rate 
Regimes and the Dutch Disease: A panel data Analysis,” Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta Working Paper 
No. 2008-12 (Atlants: Federal Reserve Bank). 
17
 Montiel, Peter J., 2006, “Workers’ Remittances and the Long Run Equilibrium Exchange Rate: 
Analytical Issues”, Williams College, mimeo. 
18
 Yasser Abdih, Ralph Chami, Jihad Dagher, and Peter Montiel, 2008, “Remittances and Institution: Are 
Remittances a Curse?”, IMF Workign paper 08/29 (Washington: International Monetary Fund). 
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Table II. 1 
 
Remittances Impact on Poverty and Consumption 
Impact on Growth  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Positive 
Impact 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
• Evidence from South Asia and Latin 
America shows that poverty is 
reduced sharply in receiving countries 
with increase in remittances.  
 
• Evidence also shows that household 
consumption rises; in Mexico, 
consumption of durables by the 
richer households increased sharply 
as a result of remittances; household 
expenditure on education also rises 
implying that remittances result in 
increased human capital. 
 
 
• Macro-economic stability (i.e. a higher 
trade deficit does not lead to balance of 
payments difficulties because remittances can 
finance the gap) with all its beneficial growth 
effects. 
 
• Increase in investible funds and lower 
interest rate. 
 
• Increased human capital increases skill 
content of the work force 
 
 
 
 
 
Negative 
Impact 
 
 
 
 
 
• May increase preference for leisure 
and reduction of labor supply. 
 
• Encourages premature 
consumerism 
• Lower pressure on government to 
improve services 
 
• Increased pressure on 
government to pursue 
consumption supporting 
policy framework (discussed 
later) 
 
 
 
 
 
• Loss of international competitiveness (the  
Dutch disease problem) 
 
• If financial markets are segmented, 
remittances may promote inefficient 
financial intermediation 
 
• Increased human capital may result in greater 
out flow of educated, skilled, workers. 
 
• Lower pressure on governments to pursue 
growth enhancing reforms.  
 
• Promotes corruption and thus erodes 
institutions  
 
 
The discussion above shows that theory is ambiguous about the growth impact of 
remittances.  Further more, the empirical evidence also does not provide strong support to 
the view that remittances are growth enhancing.  
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Figure III-1    
  
Source: World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects/IMF BoP Statistics 2008 
 
 
 
 
 Source: World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects/IMF BoP Statistics 2008  
 
 
Figure III-2 
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Figure III-3 
 
Source:  World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects/IMF BoP Statistics 2008 and World Development 
Indicators 2008 
 
Figure III-4 
Source:  World World Bank’s Global Economic Prospects/IMF BoP Statistics 2008 and World 
Development Indicators 2008 
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Figure III-5 
Source:  World Development Indicators 2008 
 
 
The Consumption Boom   
 
The anecdotal evidence of the consumption boom coinciding with the period of high 
remittances in South Asia is overwhelming. The rising South Asian middle class, well 
travelled internationally and exposed to world-wide television networks is nowable to 
maintain an international standard of living. Western style shopping malls have sprung up 
in all South Asian capitals and major urban centers, well stocked with East Asia made 
consumer durables purchased by the well informed middle class, thanks to western 
mobile phone companies, via credit cards issues by European and US commercial banks.  
 
Highway corridors radiating out of the large urban centers have the equivalent of strip 
malls sprinkled with glass and granite exterior shops that have improved access to 
consumption good of the rural middle class. Even the lower middle class and the working 
poor are better clothed and better-fed than ever before. 
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Snapshots of the evidence of a consumption boom in South Asia 
  
For all those global marketers who have missed the potential of India’s billion plus 
people and their growing market power, here’s a nudge from the McKinsey Global 
Institute (MGI).  A new report released in May by the economics research institute at 
McKinsey predicts that India’s much-touted middle class has finally taken wings and will 
soon embark on a consumption spree that could reshape global consumer markets. The 
country is also set to become the fifth-largest consuming economy (behind the US 
 
India’s economic growth has accelerated significantly over the past two decades and so 
too has the spending power of its citizens.  With rising income, household consumption 
has soared and a new Indian middle class has emerged.  And as the income growth rolls 
across Indian society, a huge shift is underway from spending on necessities such as food 
and clothing to choice –based spending on categories such as household appliances and 
restaurants”. The report predicts that with growth rates of 7.3%, Indian income level will 
triple over the next 20 years lifting 291 people out of poverty to create, by 2025, 583 
million strong middle class.  This will create a consumer market of $.5 trillion, four times 
the present $380 million. 
 
Asia Times, July 1, 2007 quoting “The Bird of Gold: The Rise of India’s Consumer Market”, 
McKinsey Global Institute. 
 
US $250 million package water business in India is growing at a whopping rate of 60 
percent annually with rapid urbanization and  a ballooning middle class which is giving 
a boost to (bottled water) Industry …India is already the tenth largest water consumer in 
the world. 
 
Sahara Times, 22 November 2008  
    
 
This trend of rising consumption is captured well in national income accounts of South 
Asian economies. Figure III-7 shows that consumption in India and Sri Lanka increased 
five fold between 1970 and 2007 with the fastest growth registered since the 1990’s. 
Pakistan’s economy in the 1990’s was relatively dormant because of macro-economic 
difficulties and so was the growth in consumption. However, income growth and 
consumption rebounded sharply in 2002.  
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Figure III-6 
Source:  World Development Indicators 2008 
 
The Evolving Structure of the Economies 
 
The sectoral composition of South Asian economies, measured in terms of shares in total 
GDP, has changed significantly in the period of substantially increased remittances, a form 
in consumption spending and rapid economic growth, 1980-2006. Agriculture’s share in 
GDP has declined sharply by 17 percentage points from 38 percent to 21 percent. 
Strikingly, industry’s share increased by just 3 percentage points in this period of rapid 
economic growth. The services sector, on the other hand, saw a significant increase of 13 
percentage points in its share.  
 
The pattern of agricultures’ decline and growing importance of services in the national 
economy is repeated in all South Asian economies. However, there are some surprises with 
respect to the share of industry. 
 
India, by far the largest economy in South Asia and one that grew the most rapidly, saw a 
halving of agriculture’s share in GDP, a modest increase in industry’s share and a 
substantial increase of 16 percentage points in the services sector’s share. In Pakistan, the 
increase in the share of services was 7 percentage points, agriculture’s share halved and 
industry’s share increased by a modest 2 percentage points. Sri Lanka is striking in that the 
share of industry actually fell by 2 percentage points in the quarter century of consumption 
led boom. The sharp increase in the services sector and a sharp decline in agriculture’s 
share was similar to the other three major South Asian economies.  
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Bangladesh, on the other hand, bucks the South trend at least with respect to Industry 
whose share increased by 8 percentage points while the services’ share increased by a 
modest 4 percentage points. Agriculture’s decline, however, was consistent with the South 
Asian pattern. 
 
What does this evolving structure of South Asian economies, with services accounting for 
the largest and the fastest growing sector, imply for overall productivity and therefore 
economic growth?   
 
Figure III-7 
 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008 
 
Figure III-8 
  
 
Source:  World Development Indicators 2008 
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Figure III-9 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators 2008 
 
Figure III-10 
 
 
Source:  World Development Indicators 2008 
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Figure III-11 
 
 Source:  World Development Indicators 2008 
 
Figure III-12 
 
 Source:  World Development Indicators 2008 
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Figure III-13 
 
 
 Source:  World Development Indicators 2008 
 
Role of Policy 
 
Understanding the role of policy in the evolution of the economic structures in South 
Asia is important for obvious reasons. It is useful to be able to identify the policies that 
are likely to have the greatest impact on restructuring the economy. In low middle 
income South Asia, this is particularly attractive since it will help focus scarce resources 
on those triggers that will put the economies on the higher growth trajectory quickly and 
efficiently and thus facilitate achieving the objective of single digit poverty. 
 
One approach to understanding the role of policy in South Asia’s economic growth is to 
carry out detailed country case studies and examine growth experiences under broad 
categories of policy regimes that capture degrees of economic liberalization19. Each 
country’s policy regimes are described as falling under one or the other six broad 
categories of liberalization and then economic performance is assessed in terms of 
industrial and overall GDP growth.  The findings are reported in Table III.2.  The 
problem with this approach is the difficulty of establishing causality because of 
extraneous factors. For example, Pakistan’s record of liberalization has been quite good 
and yet economic performance has been highly varied. This is largely because 
geopolitical considerations (CENTO and SEATO alliances, Soviet occupation of 
Afghanistan and more recently the war on terror) have driven large inflows of 
concessionary external financing rather than reform. Such inflows have a stop-go 
                                                 
19
 Kirit Parikh edited, Explaining Growth in South Asia, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2006. 
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character to them that dominates the economic reform impact. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s civil 
war would have repressed economic outcomes regardless of the policy regime. The 
recent escalation of terrorist activity in Pakistan has also adversely affected growth 
outcomes regardless of the pace of economic reform.       
 
Contextualizing South Asia’s growth performance in the discussion on the role of policy 
in economic growth, it has been argued 20 that the impressive development performance 
since the 1980s is the result sound policies - many of which are consistent with the 
“Washington consensus”21 and other more recent approaches to economic growth22. This 
policy framework, it is argued, has supported growth, improved human development, and 
helped reduce poverty. Thus South Asia’s good development outcomes, despite the weak 
institutions, is not as much of a “puzzle” or “surprise” as some might think, because a 
large number of good policies have prevailed despite overall weak institutions. 
 
It is recommended that these policies be continued, but institutions also need to be 
strengthened to accelerate growth and achieve a faster pace of poverty reduction. The 
evidence on growing income inequality is highlighted and ascribed to policy and 
institutional failures that need to be addressed to make growth work better for the poor.  
 
 
Table III.223:   
Policy regime 
Impact on industrial growth Impact on GDP 
growth 
Free market with passive policies Sri Lanka: virtually no growth Sri Lanka: 
Modest growth 
Import substitution based 
industrialization with some controls 
on pricing and production and trade 
Good industrial growth except in 
Bangladesh where disruption due to 
civil war; but impetus peters out, 
especially in small economies   
Poor growth  
ISI strategies with stricter control 
and regulation of production and 
trade along with nationalization and 
emphasis on the public sector 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka pursue 
this in the 1970s and see little 
industrial growth 
Poor growth 
Regulated industries, trade 
restrictions but with export 
promotion 
Sri Lanka saw growth rate of 9.91 
percent; Bangladesh saw relatively 
modest growth in 1981-89.  
6.6% in Sri 
Lanka 
Deregulation of domestic industries 
and modest trade liberalization   
Even with some import restrictions, 
healthy growth rate  
6.6% in Sri 
Lanka 
                                                 
20
 Sadiq Ahmed (World Bank, 2006) 
21
 John Williamson Ed., “What Washington means by Policy Reform”, in Latin American Adjustment: How 
much has Happened? Washington DC: Institute of International Economics, 1990 
22
 See, for example, Michael Spence   
23
 Summarized from Kirit Parikh, “Explaining Growth in South Asia”, Oxford University Press , New 
Delhi, 2006.   
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Policy regime 
Impact on industrial growth Impact on GDP 
growth 
Deregulation and liberalized trade  
regime 
A spurt in growth rates in all five 
countries but then slow down. In 
India industrial growth rise to 7.6 
percent but then slows down to 4.8 
percent. In Pakistan, also industrial 
growth slows down in the 1990’s.    
Indian GDP 
growth,  1992-
96, shoots up to 
6.7 percent but 
then slows down 
to 5.4 percent 
after 1997.  
 
 
Perhaps the best known, and most criticized, view of the policies that matter in explaining 
growth is ascribed to Williamson. He was the first to put out a list of ten policy reforms, 
the elements of the co-called “Washington Consensus”: 
 
– Maintain fiscal discipline as measured by low fiscal deficits 
– Set public expenditure priorities that favor health and education 
expenditures rather than defense spending, general public administration, 
and subsidies 
– Undertake tax reforms to increase revenues using a broadly based tax 
system with low marginal rates. 
– Move to interest rates that are market based and are positive in real terms 
– Maintain a competitive exchange rate to promote exports 
– Base trade policy on import liberalization with moderate tariffs (10 to 20 
percent with little dispersion) 
– Encourage foreign direct investment 
– Support privatization 
– Promote competition through deregulation 
– Define and ensure property rights          
    
As discussed above, several South Asian economies have implemented, with varying 
degree of completion, policies encompassed by the Washington consensus and with 
varying success.    
 
Devarajan and Nabi24 have assessed (see earlier discussion in Chapter 2 above) recent 
economic performance in South Asia in light of the binding constraints to growth 
identified in other contexts. These include wide spread perception of corruption, civil 
conflict, high fiscal deficit, enclave economy characteristics and misaligned exchange 
rates. However, South Asian economies appear to have overcome their respective binding 
constraints. Devarajan and Nabi argue that while South Asia may well have overcome the 
binding constraints in the short run, they will come back to haunt them in the long run as 
they strive for higher growth rates of 8-10 percent.    
    
                                                 
24
 Shantayanan Devarajan and Ijaz Nabi, Promising, Unequalizing, Sustainable,  EPW August 19, 2006 
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Part II of this monograph takes a sectoral perspective on the policy framework needed to 
sustain high growth in services, agriculture and manufacturing. The policy discussion for 
manufacturing will identify the policy framework that has stunted the growth of the 
manufacturing which, in turn, has adversely affected South Asia’s ability to generate high 
productivity jobs to reduce poverty to single digits and improve the welfare of South 
Asian citizens.  
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Part II: Sustaining High Growth into the Future
 36
 
IV:  Modernizing Services 
 
 
Services and Economic Growth 
 
The Balassa-Samuelson Hypothesis25 states that rich countries tend to have higher price 
levels than poor countries not simply because the rich countries have higher absolute 
productivity levels than poor countries, but because rich countries are relatively more 
productive in the traded goods sector. Non-traded goods tend to be more service 
intensive and there is much less room for establishing technological superiority. 
Historical data confirms that in most industrialized economies, technological progress in 
service intensive goods (education, health, insurance etc.) has been slower than for 
manufactures, which tend to be more traded. 
 
A separate strain of literature26 argues that with appropriate policies and by attracting 
FDI, the services sector in less well-off economies can experience sustained productivity 
growth. The structure and performance of the services sector in a sample of Eastern 
European economies for the periods 1997-2000 and 2001-2004 reveal that: i) while most 
service sub-sectors are characterized by strong productivity growth, there persist large 
disparities in labor productivity growth rates across countries and sub-sectors; ii) that 
services that produce or employ Information and Communication Technologies (ICTs), 
or utilize more skilled labor, show substantially higher labor productivity levels; iii)  
labor productivity is higher in countries that have achieved more progress in services 
sector reforms, particularly in financial intermediation; and iv) there is a positive and 
significant relationship between liberalization of services and labor productivity of 
downstream manufacturing sub-sectors. 
 
Research on the East Asian experience27shows that when manufacturing is dynamic and 
export-led, the services sector follows suit. Since 1980, East Asian economies have 
experienced average growth rates of 8.1 percent in the services sector. Meanwhile, 
manufacturing GDP growth averaged 24 percent. Given the growth experienced in both 
the services and the manufacturing, it is argued that it is highly probable that the mutually 
reinforcing spillovers effects are real and significant.   
 
The main conclusions on the role of services in growth from the literature thus are: 
 
• Productivity growth is higher in tradable than in non-tradable sectors 
• Services, typically, are non-traded and therefore would have lower productivity 
than trade goods 
• Tradable services have higher productivity growth 
                                                 
25
 Bela Balassa, 1964. "The Purchasing-Power Parity Doctrine: A Reappraisal," Journal of Political 
Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 72, pg. 584; Samuelson, P. A. (1964), "Theoretical Notes on 
Trade Problems", Review of Economics and Statistics 46 (2): 145–154 
26
 Ana M. Fernandes (2007) 
27
 Clemes et al (2003) 
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• FDI in tradable services increases productivity in services  
• Productivity in services increases with growth in manufactured exports.     
    
A recent World Bank study28 takes an uncharacteristically strong position in advocating 
that services will deliver high growth in South Asia.  The three characteristics of services 
that are usually considered as hampering the sector’s role in delivering high growth are i) 
typically, labor productivity is low in services, ii) they are skill intensive and, given 
education attainments, this poses a difficult supply constraint and iii) they suffer from 
geographic concentration that leads to unbalanced growth. It is then argued that all three 
constraints can be surmounted. The second constraint can be relieved via an aggressive 
program for expanding education and the third is not just restricted to services; 
manufacturing can also be similarly concentrated. Therefore, a proactive policy will be 
needed to address this constraint. The primary thrust of the World Bank study is on 
explaining why services have come to be so central in South Asia growth, how much they 
contribute to growth and why services led growth is likely to be sustained.  
 
The virtuous cycle of economic growth requiring high economic density/population 
density, low distance/low transportation costs, and less division/more trade would suggest 
that the manufacturing traded goods will deliver sustained high growth29.  Services, on 
the other hand, usually considered to be bound by “time” and “proximity” entails higher 
transaction cost, are not easily traded. Thus they do not provide a hook into international 
demand and therefore do not deliver sustained high growth.   
 
It is argued30 that technology is changing this traditional view of services. Information 
communication technology has given us the three T’s: technology, transportability and 
tradability, so that new services have emerged that are easily traded. Indeed, the 
technology has enabled countries such as India to overcome the binding constraint of 
poor infrastructure to enjoy a comparative advantage in international trade that would 
otherwise not be possible. High value exported services, responding to global demand, 
are thus a new variety of services that have little in common with the traditional services 
and can deliver sustained high growth.  
 
The central role of services in economic growth also emerges out of the literature on New 
Economic Geography (NEG)31 that is grounded in the well known ideas of increasing 
returns to scale, trade costs and factor mobility that together produce comparative 
advantage via agglomeration32.  It is argued that these advantages of economic geography 
come into play for services as opposed to manufactured goods, in whose context the NEG 
                                                 
28
 “Services-led Growth in South Asia”, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia 
Region, World Bank, April 2009.  
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 World Development Report, 2009. 
30
 “Is Services-Led Growth A Miracle For South Asia?” by Ejaz Ghani in “Services-led Growth in South 
Asia”, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia Region, World Bank, April 2009. 
31
 “New Economic Geography, Services and South Asia” by Maarten Bosker and Harry Garretsen in 
“Services-led Growth in South Asia”, Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Unit, South Asia 
Region, World Bank, April 2009. 
32
 Paul Krugman, “Increasing Returns and Economic Geography”, Journal of Political Economy, 99: 483-
499  
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theory was developed, once Information Communication Technology allows developing 
countries to overcome their infrastructure constraint.      
 
Which view on services explains best the ongoing restructuring of South Asian 
economies requires an empirical examination of the evidence. Here it is important to 
point out at the outset that statistical information on services is poor compared to the data 
on manufacturing and agriculture. The emphasis in the development literature in the past 
has been on the importance of agriculture and manufacturing and data pertaining to these 
sectors is of reasonable quality. Services, on the other hand, are both ill-defined and 
poorly measured. This in itself is a good reason to avoid any sweeping conclusions about 
services and their role in the economy.   
 
Not-withstanding the statistical difficulties, it is well-established that services now 
constitute the largest and growing segment of South Asian economies. Given per capita 
GDP, in all major South Asian economies i.e. Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri 
Lanka, value added in services is higher than for comparator countries. This is especially 
so with respect to the East Asian economies where GDP per capita is higher compared to 
South Asia but the share of services in the economy is smaller. 
 
 
Current State of South Asian Services 
 
Composition of services 
 
The four main categories of services are Construction (Con), Wholesale/retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels (wsh), transport, storage and communications (tsc) and other 
activities (financial intermediation, business services and social work (fbs). By far, the 
largest share in GDP is that of the last group of services whose share in total value added 
in the past 25 years has increased from 21% to 28%. The share of whole sale, retail, 
restaurants and hotels is up from 14% to 17%, transport, storage and communications 
services share doubled to 12%, and construction is up from 5% to 7%.  
 
At the country level, financial intermediation and business services have grown the 
fastest and now account for 28% of total value added.  Whole sale and retail trade, 
restaurants and hotels and transport, storage and communications have increased by about 
5 percentage points. Construction’s share is more or less flat. 
 
In Pakistan all four major categories of services have grown relatively modestly between 
0% and 3% growth, while the construction sector’s share in total value added shows a 
slight decline.  
 
In Sri Lanka also the increase in the share of services in total value added is relatively 
modest across the four major category of services, none growing by more than about 3% 
(which is wholesale, retail trade, restaurants and hotels). 
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Figure IV.1.1 
             Source: United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Data 2009 
 
Figure IV.1.2 
        Source: United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Data 2009 
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Figure IV.1.3 
 
        Source: United Nations Statistics Division, National Accounts Data 2009 
 
 
 Splintering of services 
 
The case for services as the new engine of growth rests on the view that services are 
splintering into traditional services that are characterized by low technology and low 
productivity and the high technology, “information age” services that have high 
productivity and a large untapped international demand.33 
 
Modern services thus are tradable and enjoy the agglomeration effects previously 
associated with tradable goods only. This requires a better understanding of what 
constitutes modern services and their role in the economies of South Asia.  
 
Consistent with the recent World Bank report, modern services comprise Banking, 
Insurance, Financial and Communication related services. Traditional services comprise 
Trade, Hotels and Restaurants, Personal, Cultural and Recreational, Community and 
Social, Transportation, Storage, Real Estate dwelling and Government and Public 
Administration services. Using this composition of traditional and modern services, in the 
                                                 
33
 Bhagwati, Jagdish. 1984a, “Splintering and Disembodiment of Services and Developing Nations”, The 
World Economy 7:: 133-134; 1984b, “Why are Services Cheaper in Poor countries?” Economic Journal 94: 
279-86.; 1987, “Trade in Services and Multilateral Negotiations”, World Bank Economic Revierw 1: 549-
69. 
 41
period 2000-06, most South Asian economies achieved substantially higher growth rates 
in modern services compared to traditional services. The difference in the growth rates 
ranged from 3% in Bangladesh to 13% in Sri Lanka. Only in Nepal the growth rates were 
the same for two types of services. Thus, it would appear that the splintering of services 
is going on.  
 
Table IV.1.1: Difference in the Growth rates of Modern and Traditional Services  
 
 
Bangladesh  
 
3% higher 
 
India 
 
 
 
5.5% higher 
 
 
 
Nepal 
 
 
 
No difference 
 
 
 
Pakistan 
 
 
 
4% higher 
 
 
 
Sri Lanka 
 
 
 
13% higher 
Adapted from Ghani, Ejaz.  
 
 
Trade in services 
 
Despite the rapid growth of modern services in South Asia, services, by and large, are not 
export oriented (Figure Iv.1.4). In Bangladesh, services have constituted less than 5% of 
total exports and there is little evidence of improvement.  In Pakistan, the share in total 
exports is somewhat higher (12%) but is stagnant. The exception to this general South 
Asian trend is India where services share in exports had, by 2005, doubled from around 
20% in the early 1990’s.  
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Figure IV.1. 4 
 
Source: WTO Trade Statistics 2008 
 
 
The impact of services on South Asia’s overall trade can also be viewed from the 
perspective of balance of payments34. The traded services in South Asia are 
Transportation, Travel, Communications, construction, Royalties and license fees, 
Finance and insurance and computer and business services. Bangladesh, Nepal, 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka have run up an overall deficit in the services account of the 
balance of payments. Only India ($11.7 billion or 1.3% of GDP) and the Maldives 
($240 million or a hefty 26% of GDP) have a surplus. In India, this is due to the 
export of computer and business services that generated $52 billion in export earnings 
in 2006. In the Maldives, travel related services (tourism) generated $434 million.  
 
Services are also attracting an increasing volume of FDI into South Asia. Between 
1990 and 2006, the stock of FDI increased from about US$5 billion (1.2% of South 
Asian GDP) to US$73 billion (6.5 % of GDP).  India (from $1.7 billion to $50.7 
billion) and Pakistan ($2 billion to $14.8 billion) accounted for most of the increase.  
Nearly 50% of the increase in FDI in India was in the services sector while in 
Pakistan it was 70%.  
 
 
 
                                                 
34
 Barry Bosworth and Annemie Maertens. “The Role of Services Sector in Economic Growth And 
Employment Generation in South Asia”. 
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Figure IV.1.5.  
 
     Source: WTO Trade Statistics 2008 
 
 
Figure IV.1.6  
 
  Source: WTO Trade Statistics 2008 
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India’s remarkable success 35 
 
Clearly, India is an outlier in South Asia in terms of growth of modern, export oriented 
service activity.  Software production starting at $1.1 billion in 1996-97 increased 
exponentially to US$23 billion in 2006. India now accounts for 60% of global 
outsourcing. This is talked about as the second great unbundling of the production 
process whereby the parent firm unbundles its spatial value chain by outsourcing over 
great distances. The routine tasks are sent to low wage economies while the complex 
tasks are done in the high wage economy of firm’s location36. It is consistent with the 
predictions of the New Economic Growth models centered around economic geography.   
 
Several factors account for India’s emergence as a software giant. One is the sharp 
decrease in the cost of communications. The cost of a three minute call from South Asia 
to the US fell from $6 in 1997 to $2 in 2004. The cost of internet has fallen even more 
dramatically. But this factor alone is not enough since many countries could have 
benefited from it. The availability of a large number of low wage English speaking 
workers would also matter. But the success of Ireland shows that this alone is also not 
enough and that a gigantic low wage work force is not needed to succeed in software 
services. A comparison of India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the three relatively successful 
exporters of computer and business services in South Asia, is illuminating.  
 
The likely determinants of success in these services would be the quality of infrastructure 
(electrification, availability of the internet and its bandwidth, telephony) and education 
(secondary and tertiary workers) and facility with English language. Table IV.1.2 shows 
that no country is an outlier in terms of these determinants.  India is better placed 
compared to Pakistan and Sri Lanka regarding the number of internet users but Sri Lanka 
has a larger proportion of broadband subscribers.  Pakistan and Sri Lanka have twice the 
number of telephone subscribers compared to India. Electrification rates in India and 
Pakistan are about the same and both are lower than Sri Lanka’s. And yet India’s export 
of computer and business services is a hundred times that of Pakistan and Pakistan’s is 
twice that of Sri Lanka.  Clearly, there is a missing story here! 
 
The following story line is offered as a hypothesis to explain India’s magnificent success.  
India’s large diaspora based in California and other state-of-the-art clusters of computer 
and business services and their access to international networks at a time when the second 
great unbundling was starting probably gave India the initial advantage. The timing of 
deregulation of telecommunications in India made it an attractive destination, particularly 
in forward looking cities like Bangalore that had a critical mass of IIT graduates and 
entrepreneurs like WIPRO’s Azim Premji looking for new global opportunities. The 
economies of scale and agglomeration effects then did the rest.   
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Asia” in E. Ghani World Bank report..   
36
 Robert-Nicoud, F. 2008. “Offshoring  of Routine Tasks and Deindustrialization: Threat or Opportunity 
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The question is why Pakistan and Sri Lanka did not go the same route despite their 
advantage in having their respective diasporas in the right places and better infrastructure 
than India’s? To some extent, the answer may lie in the acute internal security situation. 
Sri Lanka was in a protracted civil war that claimed most of policy attention. Pakistan 
was also faced with deteriorating external security combined with political and macro-
economic instability that were a huge distraction. Given the importance of security 
concerns, it is not surprising that India’s more peaceful South, especially Bangalore, was 
the first to attract international interest in computer and business services.       
 
Table IV. 1. 2:  Export of  Computer and Business Services and Some Correlates 
 
  India  Pakistan  Sri Lanka 
       
Export of computer and 
business services 
 
 
$52.3billion  
 
$556 million  $288 million 
  
     
Electrification rate  
 
0.56  
 
0.54  
 
0.66 
       
Internet users per 1000 people  
 
 
17.1  
 
10.7  
 
4 
 
Broadband subscribers per 100 
people 
 
 
 
 
 
0.27 
 
 
 
0.08 
 
 
 
0.33 
 
Telephone subscribers per 100 
people 
 
 
 
 
23 
 
 
 
51 
 
 
 
56 
       
 
Secondary enrollment rate (%) 
Male (Female) 
 
 
 
59 (49) 
  
32 (25) 
  
83 (89) 
  
     
 
Tertiary enrollment rate (%) 
Male (Female) 
 
 
 
13 (9) 
  
5 (4)  
- (-) 
  
    
 
# of English speakers 
  
90000 
  
17000 
  
1910 
  
     
 
% of English speakers 
 
 
 
10.7 
 
 
 
10.4 
 
 
 
9.9 
 
Adapted from Bosker and Garretsen (2008) and Bosworth and Maartens (2008). 
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Services as the Engine of Future Growth 
 
The review of the structure of the services sector in South Asia establishes that three 
countries where services have growth the fastest are: India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka. 
Services now comprise the largest sector in these economies. Furthermore, services are 
increasingly splintered into modern and traditional services and the modern services are 
growing faster than traditional services. In India, the modern services are dominated by 
computer and business services for which India has established itself as a world leader. 
This, especially the Indian experience has led to the view that South Asia has found it 
own, different, route to development: that South Asia’s development will be services-led 
rather than manufacturing-led which is East Asia’s path (and also the developed 
countries’ in the past) to development.  
 
It was argued earlier that for a sector to be the economy’s engine of long term sustained 
growth, it has to satisfy two requirements. One is that it should create jobs of rising 
worker productivity that would lead to rising wages and improved standards of living. 
The other is that that the sector should create lots of jobs so that more and more workers 
benefit from rising productivity and wages.  
 
Is services the sector that will result in long term sustained growth of the kind outlined 
above? The three graphs (IV.1.7 to IV.1.9) attempt an answer. Figure IV.1.7 shows how 
the services sector has grown since the 1980’s. India is clearly the outlier with consistent 
and increasing growth in services since the 1980’s. In Pakistan, growth slipped in the 
1990’s as did the overall economy because of macro-economic and political uncertainties 
of that decade. Growth in Sri Lanka’s services weakened in recent years as internal 
security deteriorated because of the civil conflict. 
 
The evidence on growth in worker productivity is presented in Figure IV.1.8. Growth in 
output per worker has been robust in India, the most successful service sector South 
Asian economy, but is variable. It doubled between the decades of the 1980’s and the 
1990’s but then tapered off. It Pakistan worker productivity growth in services has 
impressive in the 1980’s but has since fallen sharply. It has also weakened in Sri Lanka in 
recent years.  
 
Employment growth in the three countries is presented in Figure IV.1.9. In both India and 
Pakistan, employment growth in services has been robust, more so in India than in 
Pakistan. However, in Sri Lanka, employment growth in services is less stable.  
 
How do productivity and employment growth in services compare with agriculture and 
industry? This is seen for the three countries in graphs IV.1.10a to IV.1.12b.  In India, 
worker productivity growth in industry was as high in Industry in the 1990’s.  
 
Agriculture, on the other hand, has seen continuous decline in productivity. In Pakistan, 
worker productivity in industry was higher than for services in the 1980’s and the 1990’s 
but has fallen recently. Worker productivity in agriculture, that was robust in the past, fell 
sharply in 2000-06.  In Sri Lanka, worker productivity in industry has continued to fall in 
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the last 26 years. Agriculture has also seen a decline in worker productivity in recent 
years.  
 
Employment growth in India has been somewhat higher in industry than in services in 
recent years. In Pakistan employment growth in industry is quite strong and in recent 
years was stronger than in services.  In Sri Lanka, employment growth in industry is the 
strongest of all sectors and has been so throughout 1990-2006. 
 
Given the strong productivity growth potential in agriculture and the robust albeit 
episodic growth and employment potential in industry, it would appear that South Asia 
can ill-afford to focus only on the services sector.  This is all the more important in view 
of the fact that 57 percent, 68 percent and 75 percent of the labor force in India, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka, respectively, is employed in agriculture and industry (Table IV.1.3). 
Policy challenges in all three sectors of the economies need to be addressed for sustained 
high growth. In the following sections, employment and productivity challenges faced by 
South Asia’s agriculture and manufacturing will be discussed. A brief summary of the 
challenges facing the services sector is presented in this section.  
 
Box I.IV.1 
 
Figure IV.1.13 below shows that China outperforms India in overall productivity and 
TFP growth and in labor productivity in all three sectors of the economy. Indeed, if India 
were to emulate China’s performance in labor productivity growth in industry, the overall 
gain to the economy would be larger than pursuing the path of services-led growth.  Thus 
it may be premature to declare the services sector to be the sole deliverer of South Asian 
economic growth. 
Sources of Growth in Output per Worker 
in India and China, 1980-2006
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Continued low productivity in agriculture, manufacturing and traditional services such as 
retail trade and construction should be a major concern for policy makers since the 
sectors will remain important for the vast majority of the 1.4 billion South Asians. 
 
 
Figure IV.1.7 
Output Growth in Services: India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka
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Figure IV.1.8 
Employment Growth in Services: India, 
Pakistan, Sri Lanka
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Figure IV.1.9 
Output Per Worker Growth in Services: 
India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1980-1990 1990-2000 2000-2006
A
n
n
u
a
l P
e
rc
e
n
ta
ge
 
Ch
a
n
ge
India
Pakistan
Sri Lanka
 
                      
India:Output Per Worker Growth
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
1980-
1990
1990-
2000
2000-
2006
A
n
n
u
al
 
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 
Ch
an
ge Agricuture
Industry
Services
 
Figure IV.1.10a 
 
Pakistan: Output Per Worker Grow th
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 Figure IV.1.10c 
 
 
Sri Lanka: Output Per Worker Growth
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Figure IV.1.10b 
 
India: Employment Growth
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Figure IV.1.10d 
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Pakistan: Employment Growth
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Figure IV.1.10e 
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Figure IV.1.10e 
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Table IV.1.3
 
Percentage Share of Employment by Sector 
   
            
    
1980 1990 2000 2006 
Pakistan37  
          
  
Agriculture 52.72 47.45 42.09 43.37 
  
Industry 9.56 12.38 13.91 13.93 
  
Services 37.72 40.17 44 42.7 
  
  100 100 100 100 
Sri Lanka38       
  
Agriculture 49.8 47 40.3 41.2 
  
Industry 12.06 19.2 23.6 26.6 
  
Services 38.14 33.8 36 32.2 
  
  100 100 99.9 100 
India39       
  
Agriculture 68.82 67.2 56.67 58.17 
  
Industry 11.71 10.05 14.02 12.36 
  
Services 19.47 22.75 29.31 29.47 
    
100 100 100 100 
                                                 
37
 Computed from the State Bank of Pakistan’s Annual Report 2006-2007 
38
 Computed from the Sri Lanka Labor Force Survey – Final Report 2006-2007 
39
 NSS 61st.Round ‘Employment and Unemployment Situation in India- Part I, Report No. 515 
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Challenges Ahead 
 
Services have an important role in raising the overall productivity level and wages in the 
economy and thus contribute to sustained high growth. But impediments to the growth of 
modern services will have to be removed and their capacity to generate jobs will need to 
be enhanced. Some of the areas of reform identified in the literature40 include: 
 
Better integration of areas with low productivity, traditional skills with those that have 
higher productivity modern skills. This will require removing impediments in the 
mobility of labor and capital between regions. 
 
Since modern services are education intensive so that increase in the enrollment of 
secondary and tertiary education and improvement in the quality of education at all levels 
is essential for completing the transition to modern services.  
 
The quality of infrastructure will need to be improved, in particular the communications 
infrastructure even in India that is the most advanced South Asian economy in 
modernizing services.  While it is established that India’s telecom reform helped the 
economy by-pass the infrastructure constraints faced by manufactured goods, by 
international standards, there is still a lot to be done to continue to increase returns in 
modern services.  Data from WDR 2009 on international integration is summarized in 
Table 1.IV.4. India does better than other South Asian countries (but not Sri Lanka) in 
terms of band-width but there is a huge gap compared to Thailand, Malaysia and China. 
On international calls traffic and cost of calls also South Asia doesn’t do too well and 
more investment will be needed to reduce costs. 
 
Table 1.IV.4 
 
  
Internet bandwidth (bits per 
person) 
 
Voice (international 
calls traffic in 
minutes per person) 
Three minute 
call cost (US$) 
  
      
Bangladesh  8 6.4 2.02 
India   24.3 3 1.19 
Nepal   4.6 5.6 2.04 
Pakistan   4.6 10.5 1.03 
Sri Lanka   25.1 27.9 2.11 
Thailand   156.2 14.1 0.67 
Malaysia   124.5 87.9 0.71 
China   195.7 7.3 2.9 
 
                                                 
40
 See, among others, “Trade in Services: Access to foreign markets, domestic reform and international 
negotiations”, South Asia Region, The World Bank, 2003. 
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In addition to telecommunications infrastructure, electricity provision is also crucial for 
modernizing services since it facilitates the up gradation and speeding up of the processes 
in the services supply chain. Investment in telecommunications and electricity will make 
more services tradable and thus further strengthen services led export growth.  
 
Modernizing the traditional servicing will require additional investment, both foreign and 
domestic. The overall quality of regulation that affects private investment in services 
needs to be improved, such as quantitative restrictions and limits on FDI.  Furthermore, 
explicit discrimination against private foreign and domestic providers of services, 
statutory policies preventing consolidation of services and weakness in the qualification 
and licensing requirements also need to be re-examined.  
 
The export markets for health and education services can be strengthened by improving 
the regulatory regime that affects the quality of services in the local regional market.  
 
To take advantage of global trade in services, the region will need to take a more 
proactive, forward looking stance in international negotiations on traded services than the 
current defensive stance that protects the status quo. This will require some domestic 
liberalization of the services regime to ensure better access to international markets for 
the regions’ traded services. 
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Table 1.IV.5: Rates of Growth, Total Economy and Major Sectors, South Asia Countries, 1980, 2006 
Average annual percentage rate of change 
Total Economy  
Services 
Agricultural 
Reallocation 
Industry 
 
 
Component 
1980-
1990 
1990- 
2000 
2000- 
2006 
1980- 
1990 
1990- 
2000 
2000- 
2006 
1980- 
1990 
1990- 
2000 
2000- 
2006 
1980- 
1990 
1990- 
2000 
2000- 
2006 
1980- 
1990 
1990- 
2000 
2000- 
2006 
 
Bangladesh 
               
   Real Output Growth 3.7 4.7 5.6 2.5 3.2 2.8 5.8 6.9 7.8 3.7 4.5 5.8    
   Employment 2.8 1.9 4.0 1.1 1.4 2.9 6.2 2.1 6.2 4.9 2.6 4.7    
   Output Per Worker 0.9 2.7 1.6 1.3 1.8 0.0 -0.4 4.7 1.5 -1.1 1.8 1.1 1.0 0.3 0.7 
 
India 
               
   Real Output Growth 5.5 5.7 7.5 3.4 2.2 2.9 7.1 5.5 8.1 6.5 8.4 9.3    
   Employment 2.0 1.6 2.9 1.2 0.8 1.6 3.6 2.2 5.2 3.6 3.4 4.4    
   Output Per Worker 3.5 4.1 4.5 2.2 1.3 1.4 3.4 3.3 2.7 2.8 4.9 4.6 0.8 0.9 1.2 
 
Maldives 
               
   Real Output Growth 11.5 7.9 6.7 11.0 1.9 6.8 11.4 9.3 9.4 11.7 8.6 6.2    
   Employment N/A 4.4 4.2 N/A -1.8 1.1 N/A 2.7 8.5 N/A 4.8 7.3    
   Output Per Worker N/A 3.3 2.5 N/A 3.8 5.6 N/A 6.4 0.8 N/A 3.6 -1.0 N/A N/A N/A 
 
Nepal 
               
   Real Output Growth 4.7 5.0 3.3 4.6 2.4 3.6 8.1 7.8 2.6 3.5 6.5 3.5    
   Employment 0.7 1.8 1.9 -0.5 -0.1 -0.1 19.1 19.5 17.7 7.9 4.6 4.2    
   Output Per Worker 4.0 3.1 1.4 5.1 2.5 3.7 -9.2 -9.8 -12.8 -4.0 1.9 -0.7 4.2 2.4 2.6 
 
Pakistan 
               
   Real Output Growth 6.1 4.4 5.4 4.0 4.4 2.1 7.7 4.2 7.3 6.6 4.5 6.1    
   Employment 2.0 2.1 4.1 1.8 1.6 2.2 1.8 1.2 6.6 2.8 3.7 5.3    
   Output Per Worker 4.0 2.2 1.3 2.2 2.8 -0.2 5.8 2.9 0.7 3.7 0.8 0.8 0.3 0.4 0.8 
 
Sri Lanka 
               
   Real Output Growth 4.2 5.1 3.8 2.8 1.9 0.8 4.5 6.8 3.5 4.9 5.8 5.1    
   Employment 1.4 2.3 2.0 1.7 -0.4 0.1 1.1 4.3 4.0 1.2 4.1 2.4    
   Output Per Worker 2.7 2.8 1.8 1.1 2.2 0.7 3.4 2.3 -0.5 3.7 1.7 2.6 0.0 0.8 0.4 
 
Source: Bosworth and Maertens (2008) 
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V.    Realizing Agriculture’s Potential 
 
 
The importance of the rural economy in South Asia cannot be overstated (Table V.1). 
More than two thirds of the region’s population resides in rural areas (over 70% in India 
and Bangladesh and 85% in Sri Lanka).  Agriculture continues to provide employment to 
a large proportion of the region’s work force (55% and 60% in India and Nepal 
respectively).  Importantly, nearly a third or more of the rural population in India, 
Pakistan, Bangladesh and Nepal consists of people living below the poverty line.  
 
And yet, South Asia’s high GDP growth appears to have by passed agriculture, whose 
share in GDP continues to decline without a commiserate increase in productivity and 
shedding of labor. 
 
 
Table V.1: The continuing significance of agriculture in South Asia 
 
  
 
Rural Population  
(% of total) 
 
Employment in  
Agriculture  
(% of total) 
 
Agriculture Share 
in GDP (%)  
 
Poverty Head 
Count, Rural  
(%) 
  1981 2007 1981 2006 1981 2007 
Early 
1990s 
2000 
and 
After 
 
Bangladesh 85 73 62 48 32 19 55.2 43.8 
Bhutan 89 67 94 56 42 21     
Nepal 94 83 90 60 61 34 43.3 34.6 
Pakistan 72 64 53 43 31 21 33.4 35.9 
Sri Lanka 81 85 47 32 28 12 27 7.9 
 
 
India 77 71 69 55 34 18 37.3 30.2 
Source: World Development Indicators 2009; Bosworth and Maertens (2008) and World Bank various 
reports. 
 
Poor performance of agriculture has serious socio-economic implications. Enclaves of 
prosperity have emerged in and around mega cities like Delhi, Bombay, Karachi, Lahore, 
Colombo and Dhaka. Villages and towns located further away from the large cities have 
stagnated thus widening the income gap between the rural and urban populations. This 
dualistic development and the consequent rise in income inequality and persistence of 
rural poverty is one of the central challenges of maintaining sustained high growth in 
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South Asia. The key for meeting this challenge is the rejuvenation of the rural economy, 
primarily agriculture. 
 
 
Competitiveness of South Asian Agriculture 
 
Agriculture’s international competitiveness is driven by crop yields or crop output per 
care. In most international comparisons, crop yields in South Asia are far below those in 
comparable countries. Figure IV.2.1 (left panel) shows this for important crops such as 
wheat, maize, rice and soybeans. Wheat yields in India and Pakistan are half those in 
China.  It is more instructive, however, to compare yields across similar endowments. 
The right panel of Figure IV.2.1 thus compares yields of wheat, paddy, cotton, maize and 
chick peas in canal irrigated, rich soil endowed, Indian and Pakistani Punjabs with 
cultivation in similar conditions in Egypt.  The figure shows Egyptian yields to be 
substantially higher for all crops. The challenge of international competitiveness thus 
remains to be addressed in South Asian agriculture.            
 
 
Figure IV.2.1: Comparison of Agricultural Performance with Best Practice 
 
(Source: Left panel:; right panel: Punjab Economic Report, World Bank, 2005 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
The evidence on yield performance over time (Figure IV.2.2) is encouraging and shows 
that improvements are possible. In the period, 1981-2007, wheat yields have nearly 
doubled in both India and Pakistan. In the same period, rice yields also increased 
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appreciably (up nearly 60% over 1981) on Indian farms and to a lesser extent in Pakistan 
(up 22%).     
Figure IV.2.2.  Trends in Yields of Wheat and Rice
Source: FAO Statistical Database
33
                 Source: FAOSTAT: FAO Statistics on Agriculture 2009 
 
 
Crop yield trends in Bangladesh and Nepal are mixed (Figure IV.2.3).  In Bangladesh 
(left panel), rice and cereal yields increased in the period 1977-1997. For jute, wheat and 
oil seeds, yields increased between 1977 and 1984 but then declined in 1997.  In Nepal 
(left panel), potato and sugarcane yields increased sharply in 1984/85 - 2004/05 but less 
impressively for oilseeds, tobacco and jute. This underscores the fact that crop yields, 
though improving compared to the past, are still significantly below potential.  
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Figure IV.2.3. Trends in Yields in Bangladesh & Nepal 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Bangladesh; Government of Nepal 
 
 
 
 
Source: Bangladesh Census of Agriculture and Livestock, 1977, 1984 and 1997, Bangladesh 
Bureau of Statistics (BBS), Ministry of Planning, Dhaka, Bangladesh; Government of Nepal 
 
 
Continuing large gaps in crop productivity across regions is a major reason for overall below 
potential performance. For four major crops ion India, rice, wheat, maize and cotton, states 
with high worker productivity in general have substantially higher crop yields compared to 
states with low worker productivity (figure IV.2.4, left panel). This points to the importance 
of raising farm worker productivity to increase country-wide yields to their potential. For 
Nepal, yield differences on account of soil and climate variation are captured in the right 
panel of Figure IV.2.4. To some extent, of course, such regional variation is unavoidable. 
Soil and climate conditions in the Terai are bound to be more conducive to rice and wheat 
cultivation than in the mountains and hills. This points to the need for crop specialization by 
regions based on comparative advantage to achieve the full potential in crop production.       
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Figure IV.2.4.  Regional Variation in  Agricultural Performance
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Constraints and Opportunities: 
 
Bangladesh 
 
In Bangladesh, agriculture’s share in GDP has dropped from around 30% in the 1990s to 
20% in 2007. The growth rate picked up in the late 1990s and reached around 5% but fell 
to its average rate of 3% by the 2000s (Bangladesh Development Series, 2007). 
Agriculture contributes 23% to GDP, 54% to employment and 15% to the country’s 
exports. The shares of individual sub-sectors are 13% for crops, 3% for livestock, 5% for 
fisheries, and 2% for forestry. The rural non-farm sector accounts for almost 33% of the 
GDP and 46% of all rural employment (Bangladesh Revitalizing Agriculture Report, 
2005).  
 
Bangladesh has managed to strengthen its food security and make a significant dent in 
rural poverty. Rice production, which makes up two-thirds of total value added by crops, 
has doubled since independence due to increase in investment and better policy 
incentives. Livestock has registered the highest growth rate during 2001-06 at 5.1%, 
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whereas fisheries grew slowly at 1.8%. In the period 2001-06, despite the decline in net 
sown area, value addition in the crop sector (at 1996 prices) has increased steadily.   
 
The increase in agriculture value added comes mainly through increased productivity of 
individual crops, multiple cropping and shifting to high valued crop production. Although 
this increased productivity has aided Bangladesh in bridging the food-gap, growth in food 
grain production has slowed from FY 2002, going down to an average of 1.8% per year 
in FY 2002-06 from an average of 2.4%t over FY 1981-2001. This can be attributed 
largely to declining rice and wheat production.  
 
After independence in 1971, the socialist model of cooperative farming was encouraged 
and implemented by the state. Procurement and distribution of inputs such as seed, 
fertilizers, and pesticides were controlled by the government managed Bangladesh 
Agricultural Development Corporation (BADC). In line with the import substitution 
model a protective umbrella was provided to the rural economy through the imposition of 
quotas, highly differentiated tariffs rates (0% to 400%), large subsidies, and an 
overvalued exchange rate. Protection of the domestic economy was further reinforced by 
market interventions in the form of credit ceiling, arbitrary licensing, and price controls. 
This policy regime had an adverse effect on production and productive efficiency 
resulting in a widening gap between demand for and supply of agricultural output (Salim, 
R and Hossain, M, Applied Economics, 2006). 
 
Agricultural policy reforms that began in the 1980’s included reduction in the role of 
government in input distribution, lowering of subsidies on agricultural inputs, 
liberalization of output markets with producers' price incentive, gradual elimination of 
the public food grain distribution system, price stabilization through open tender 
procurement policy and allowing the private sector in food grain importation (Salim, R 
and Hossain, M, Applied Economics, 2006). 
 
During the first decade of reforms, 1985-94, after an initial slow down, agriculture 
exports increased by 25% in 1995, fell in 1996 and then increased again in 1997 (by 
34%) and 1998 (by 11%).   
 
Currently, Bangladesh’s main agricultural exports comprise of raw jute and jute products, 
frozen shrimp and fish and tea. While the volume of agricultural exports (except raw jute 
and jute manufactures) has remained stable, frozen shrimp, frog legs and fish have 
emerged as significant export items. In the year 2004, agricultural imports amounted to 
$1984 million and agricultural exports $114 million. Food products comprise around 
80% of agricultural imports, while jute and tea (non-food agricultural products) account 
for over 80% of all agricultural exports.  
 
 
India 
India’s agriculture has not performed well. Growth in the sector has been far below GDP 
growth rates, turning negative in 2002-03 (-6.9%) and rising to a modest 2.3% in 2005-06 
against GDP growth rate in that year of around 8.1%. Agricultural labor productivity is 
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low with poorer states performing worse than the richer ones. Furthermore, agricultural 
yields for major crops are also lower than those of comparable developing countries.  
 
At the state level, Rajasthan is an example of where labor productivity is constrained by 
the weak linkages to input and output markets due to limited road connectivity and 
communication links (DPR 130). This discourages farmers from diversifying into higher-
value perishable products. 
 
In Punjab, employment in agriculture has declined from 53% in 1991 to 39.4 percent in 
2001. The state has 3% of India’s net sown area, 1.5% of its farming population and 
accounts for almost 20% of the country’s wheat production. Growth in such an 
agriculturally important state has, however, been a low 2.6%, below the state average of 
3.2% (RPP 24). Also, the total factor productivity growth rate has been extremely low, 
turning negative (-2.04%) in the southwest region.    
 
 
 
 
Liberalization of India’s agriculture entailed the abandoning of government intervention 
in the export and import of agricultural produce, removal of quantitative restrictions such 
Box V.1 
 
 A Case of Value Addition: Maharashtra Wine 
 
The state of Maharashtra is home to almost 20,000 hectares of vineyards that grow more than one lac (0.1 
million) tons of grapes a year. These grapes are used in the making of honey, crushes, jams, and wine. The 
latter value addition has tremendous scope in terms of generating future employment and earnings and can 
become a major export of the state and the country. There are some constraints, however, which are not 
allowing the sector to achieve its potential. 
 
One of the factors constraining the industry is the high level of domestic excise duty (300 percent on each 
bottle) which added to the already high costs of production and packaging, makes manufacturing costs 
exorbitantly high. Furthermore, wine manufacturing and marketing requires aggressive brand-building 
campaigns requiring high advertising budgets. Therefore, financially constrained small and medium sized 
local enterprises might not be able to compete with larger well-established manufacturers. Another 
important reason holding back wine production is the scarcity of water in the wine producing regions 
because of the irregularity of rains.  
 
The government of the state of Maharashtra has finally taken a step to encourage the retail end of the wine 
industry. Previously imposed license fee hikes of 200%to 400% have now been brought down to 150%to 
200%. This was in response to protests launched by many hoteliers and wine wholesalers and retailers 
associations. Although this decision has been partly offset by the imposition of an additional sales tax on 
country-made liquor manufacturing units of Rs. 18 per box, the reduction in license fee is still an incentive 
for the growth of wine businesses.  
 
The State Bank of India also took an initiative in 2001 to increase the wine yield in Maharashtra; the bank 
allocated almost Rs. 30 lacs (3 million) for the project, which is expected to be completed in 25 years. The 
aim of the project is to bring together farmers and scientists in an attempt for technological up gradation.  
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as quotas and licenses and reduction of import tariffs. Trade liberalization and the 
devaluation of the currency gave a substantial impetus to India’s agricultural exports, 
which increased substantially during the 1990’s. Thus, although agricultural growth in 
India was unimpressive, agricultural commodities, in the recent past, have accounted for 
almost 20% of the country’s total exports earnings. Some of the major agro-products 
exported are coffee, tea, tobacco, cotton, and rice, with milled rice being the most 
important, accounting for over 15% of the exports in 2003-2005. Soybean meal is a close 
second, accounting for around 10% of exports. Processed fruits exports make up the 
largest share of horticultural exports.  
 
Nepal 
 
In 2001, agriculture was 37.4 percent of Nepal’s GDP, even though only 19 percent of 
the country’s land can actually be cultivated. By the year 2005-06, agriculture’s share in 
GDP had fallen to 33.59 percent and to 32.12 percent in 2007-08. The overall 
performance of agriculture has remained poor. The country’s population growth (2.5 
percent per annum) is out pacing agricultural sector growth, which for a number of years 
has remained virtually stagnant. A major constraining feature of Nepalese agriculture is 
the lack of transport and communication network between the different arable regions. 
Hence, although the country produces an overall exportable surplus of food grains, 
inability to transport these from surplus to deficit areas leads both export and import of 
the same products. Subsistence agriculture dominates, particularly in the hilly regions.  
 
Rice is Nepal’s most important cereal crop and is cultivated on more than half of the 
cultivated area. The output of rice and other cereal crops (wheat, maize etc) has increased 
from 1991 to 2007-08. Rice cultivation is concentrated in the Terai region, which 
contributes 71% of the total output. Almost 87 percent of the seeds used in rice 
cultivation are of an improved quality, which has resulted in the recent increases in 
output.  
 
Oilseed, potato, tobacco, sugarcane, and jute comprise the main cash crops. Although the 
area under cultivation has not grown by much (land being a binding constraint in 
Nepalese agriculture), the production of these crops has registered a significant increase 
since 1991. This is due to an increase in the yield of all five crops, the most significant 
increase being that of potato which almost doubled from 6411 kg/hectare in 1984-85 to 
13110 kg/hectare in 2007-08.   
 
Since 1992, Nepal’s trade regime has been liberalized substantially. Tariff rates were 
substantially reduced and restructured. Quota’s and import licenses were also abolished 
along with state control of exports and imports. As part of the reform package, 
agricultural input subsidies have been gradually phased out. For reasons of food security, 
the only crop which still has some degree of state intervention in the form of price 
controls and government procurement is rice.  
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In 1981-82, the share of agriculture in total exports was almost 50%; since then it has 
declined to less than 12%. Vegetable ghee is the most important export. Most of the 
exports of Nepal fall under the category of primary agricultural products as most of the 
annual produce of sugarcane, jute, and tobacco are consumed domestically. The country’s 
trade is centered in the Terai region, where farmers find it easier to transport goods across 
the border to India rather than to the less accessible mountainous regions of Nepal. In 
2001, agricultural exports totaled $57.7 million, while agricultural imports amounted to 
$232.2 million. 
 
Pakistan 
 
Agriculture growth over the past few years has been steady at around 4%, except for the 
sudden decline in 2007-08 to 1.1%, attributed to natural factors (low rainfall, pest attacks 
etc) and their impact on wheat and cotton. Major crops that make up around 33.4% of the 
total value added of agriculture are estimated to perform relatively well during the year 
2008-09, hence pushing up the expected growth rate of agriculture to a respectable 4.7% 
(Economic Survey 2008).  
 
Major Kharif (June-November) crops include rice, cotton and sugarcane while wheat is 
the predominant Rabi (November-May) crop. These four major crops together make up 
29.8% of the total value added in overall agriculture and comprise around 6.5% of the 
annual GDP. Besides these crops, the single largest contributor to Pakistan’s agriculture 
is livestock, which comprises 51.8%  of the total agricultural value added. 
 
Cotton is the most important non-food cash crop in Pakistan and alone accounts for about 
7.7% of the total value added in agriculture and 1.6% of the country’s GDP.  
 
Although provisional figures for 2008-09 show that the growth rates for yield and 
production are likely to turn positive, area under cotton is expected to go down by a 
further 7.7%. The main decline in cropped area mirrors the worldwide trends: with 
competing crops fetching higher prices, worldwide cotton production is projected to 
decline by 10% in the year 2008-09. Use of better quality seeds and better technology 
(such as the BT cotton variety) is however, expected to increase cotton production. 
 
There have been significant structural changes in the system of livestock production. 
Traditional methods of production have been steadily replaced by intensification and 
commercialization, which in the future can lead the country to self-sufficiency in milk 
production. In fact, improvements in milk production and commercialization of the dairy 
industry has the potential of making Pakistan an exporter of milk to countries such as the 
Philippines, Malaysia, and Thailand (Z, Bashir, PDR, 2003).   
 
At the sub-national level, in Punjab, as in the rest of the country, agriculture is the 
mainstay of the economy, providing employment to over 40 percent of the work force 
and contributing 28% to provincial GDP. The average growth rate of Punjab’s agriculture 
over the past 20 years was 4-5%, higher than the South Asian average. This can be 
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attributed largely to adoption of high yielding crop varieties, technology, and better 
education opportunities. Total factor productivity accounts for almost half of the growth 
in output. Somewhat similar to the national trend, at 63.2%  livestock is a major 
contributor to the total agricultural value added in the province second only to the share 
of major crops, which is at 73.6%. Punjab, however, is performing below its latent 
potential. Crop yields, particularly those of wheat, rice, sugarcane, and cotton are below 
those of Indian Punjab (Figure IV. 2.1). Thus, there is a lot that can still be achieved by 
appropriate technologies (Punjab Economic Report, 2005). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In the North West Frontier Province (NWFP), crop yields are even lower than in the 
Punjab. The region has suffered negative growth rates, especially since 1997-98, when 
following a period of severe drought, wheat yields fell by 10 percent a year till 2001-02. 
Hope for NWFP agriculture now lies in the growth of fruit production; apple production 
increased at 4 percent a year up to 2002-03 and peach production grew by an average of 
Box V.2 
GM technology: The case of BT Cotton in Pakistan 
 
Cotton is one of the most important cash crops of Pakistan. It is important, not only for the 
livelihood of millions of farmers but also as an input for the country’s textile industry. In recent 
years, cotton production in Pakistan has been severely effected by pest attack. Moreover, the high 
cost of pesticide application, depressed market prices and removal of input subsidies have been a 
disincentive for farmers to grow cotton. Against this scenario, the Government of Pakistan took 
steps to adopt the use of biotechnology. The Biosafety Rules were passed in April 2005 that set up 
the legal requirements for the import, export, and handling of biological agents and genetically 
engineered organisms and vectors. Later in the same year, the Pakistan Atomic Energy 
Commission, distributed 40,000.00 Kg basic seed of BT cotton (insect resistant) varieties ‘IR-FH-
901’, ‘IR-NIBGE-2’, ‘IR-CIM-448’ and ‘IR-CIM-443’; which were grown over 8,000 acres of 
land in 2005-06.  
  
Farmers who planted BT Cotton in the heart of the cotton growing regions of Punjab, in 
Bahawalpur, Multan, Karror Pakka and Muzaffargarh,  evaluated the advantages of using the new 
seed. The cotton plant was found to be resistant to the chewing pests, including the American, 
Pink, Army, and Spotted bollworms. Also, no serious incidence of cotton leaf curl viral disease 
was reported in the BT Cotton variety. The resultant increase in yield was found to be almost 30 
percentage. On average, the yield obtained with BT cotton was around 23-28 maund (1 maund=40 
kg) per acre much higher than traditional cotton varieties which used to get farmers 17-20 maunds 
per acre. Furthermore, due to an increased number of cotton bolls per plant, the estimated 
economic gain by using BT Cotton is estimated to be more than Rs. 3000/acre. It was expected that 
cotton growers should have BT seeds of the above varieties for at least 75,000 acres of land in year 
2006-07.  
 
Biotechnology offers great benefits to the farmers of Pakistan but it needs to be implemented at the 
official level for it to have any major impact. According to the Economic Survey of Pakistan 
(2008-2009), the Ministry of Food and Agriculture has signed a letter of intent and a memorandum 
of understanding with the Monsanto Company for the provision of the latest BT Cotton seeds 
(bolgard-II) to maximize cotton productivity. In the absence of government regulation in the 
provision of seed there is a danger of seed adulteration, which can adversely affect the cotton yield 
of farmers across the country. 
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over 14 percent annually over the same period. The trend towards crop diversification in 
the province is thus clear (NWFP Economic Report, 2005).  
In accordance with WTO agreements, the government has reduced tariff rates across the 
board. For example, the simple average ad valorem tariff rate in the 2005-06 trade policy 
was just under 15 percent, compared to over 50 percent in 1995. Furthermore, 
quantitative restrictions, exchange controls, and other direct state interventions in trade 
have been largely eliminated.   
Over the past 10 years, the government has gradually phased out almost all input 
subsidies. However, there have been a few exceptions such as the fertilizer subsidy, 
which has been given intermittently. In terms of pricing and procurement, most of the 
crops are out of the ambit of government control with the exception of wheat.  
Pakistan’s main agricultural exports in FY 2006-07 comprised of rice ($1.13 billion), 
fruits and vegetables ($234 million), fish and fish preparations ($191 million), raw cotton 
($76 million), meat and meat preparations ($55 million), oilseed nuts and kernels ($22 
million) and spices ($16 million).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Box V.3 
 
Export diversification: Sargodha Kinnows 
 
Kinnow, a hybrid of two citrus cultivars, the ‘King’ and ‘Willow Leaf’ is classified as ’Kinnow 
Mandarin’ and was introduced in the subcontinent from California in 1943-44. Due to its easy-peal 
quality, high juice content and special flavor, its export demand has been constantly growing. 
Almost 95 percent of the area under citrus is located in the Punjab and kinnow accounts for over 75 
percent of the area under citrus production. The kinnow industry is also responsible for substantial 
employment; employment generated from its production and marketing is currently estimated to be 
23.48 million labor days.   
 
As far as trade is concerned, more than 90 percent of citrus exports are made up of kinnows and 
Pakistan is amongst the top ten countries that export the hybrid mandarin. According to Food and 
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations (FAOSTAT) data, the total production of mandarin 
in Pakistan was at 434,000 MT, far exceeding that of Australia’s 100,959 MT. Keeping in mind 
this potential for export, an Agriculture Sector Linkage Program (ASLP) has been introduced to 
transfer Australian knowledge and expertise as well as to enhance research and development by 
targeting, amongst other sectors, the kinnow production industry in Sargodha, Pakistan. This need 
for research is manifest in the fact that most developed countries demand seedless varieties, which 
are currently not grown in Pakistan, hence limiting its export market mostly to developing 
countries.  
 
Also, the recently introduced Sanitary and Phytosanitary requirements by the WTO require kinnow 
growers in Sargodha to be more stringent as far as pest control and packaging quality is concerned. 
Most FAO studies show that Pakistan does have a comparative advantage in kinnow production. 
The kinnow producers of the Sargodha district are thus economically efficient. The adoption of 
new technology to ensure the meeting of international standards and the use of effective incentives 
for citrus growers in the district is what is needed to improve kinnow exports.  
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Sri Lanka  
 
In Sri Lanka, the combined annual growth rate of agriculture, forestry and fisheries fell 
from an average of 1.9 percent in 1991-00 to 0.9 percent in 1998-02. The growth rate of 
agriculture alone fell from 1.6 percent to 0.4 percent over the same period. Agriculture’s 
share in total employment has also declined to 30.5 percent in 2005. The impact of the 
agriculture’s poor performance is magnified because Sri Lanka’s rural areas are home to 
almost 80 percent of its population and the rural poor account for almost 95 percent of the 
country’s total poor. 
 
Rice is the single most important crop in Sri Lanka. The average yield and total 
production of rice has increased steadily from 3857 kg/hectare in 2000 to 4137 kg/hectare 
in 2006, and total output went up from 2860,000 MT to 3341,000 MT.  
 
Tea, rubber and coconut are the three major commercial crops of Sri Lanka. However, 
the contribution of the commercial crops to gross domestic product has been declining; 
over the last 30 years, this has fallen from 11.5 percent (in 1970) to 5 percent in year 
2000.  
 
Economic liberalization started relatively early in Sri Lanka, with the first phase 
introduced in the year 1977, making Sri Lanka the most liberal South Asian trade regime. 
However due to the growing concerns of food security and livelihood of the rural 
economy, the Sri Lankan government is cautious about further reducing the tariff rates on 
agricultural trade.  
 
Sri Lanka is famous for its black tea and is the largest supplier in the world. About 95 per 
cent of all tea production was exported in the year 1999 bringing in export revenue of 
$621 million. United Kingdom, Russia, and the Middle East are the major destinations of 
Sri Lankan tea exports.  
 
Rubber exports are also a significant means of foreign exchange for the Sri Lankan 
economy. In 1999, 46% of the rubber produced was exported. The export earnings 
amounted to around $33 million, with China being the major export partner.  
 
Coconut, the third important commercial crop registered an output of 2828 million nuts in 
1999, the highest output since 1986. After accounting for domestic consumption, 35 
percent of it was exported and earned the country foreign exchange worth $129 million; 
coconut and coconut milk are mostly used in food preparations but most of coconut 
exports are in the form of kernel products (desiccated coconut, coconut oil, copra).41  
 
 
 
                                                 
41http://www.nationsencyclopedia.com/economies/Asia-and-the-Pacific/Sri-Lanka-
AGRICULTURE.html 
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Future of South Asian Agriculture 
 
Agricultural growth in South Asia has been unimpressive. Given the significance of 
agriculture in South Asian economies, it is important to implement a comprehensive 
policy for improving the performance of the sector. Salient features of such a policy 
would include: 
 
Water and Land Management 
 
Timely and adequate availability of water has to be top priority in South Asian 
agriculture. In Pakistan, the canal irrigation network, fed primarily through snowmelt and 
monsoon rains, has deteriorated severely over the years. The irrigation network diverts 
106 MAF of surface water and results in huge delivery losses through canals and water 
courses (Agriculture Perspective and Policy, 2004).  
 
In order to counter the problem of water shortage, additional reservoirs would need to be 
constructed but importantly current water resources need to be conserved. In Pakistan,   
water conservation alone can improve water supply by 10-15 percent, essentially by 
improving the efficiency of the current irrigation system. Furthermore, according to the 
APP report, Pakistan will need approximately an additional 20 MAF of water by the year 
2025.  
 
South Asian governments have begun to formulate water management policies keeping 
the future water shortages in view. Government of Pakistan has produced a ‘Water Vision 
2025’ which is to be completed in three phases and is expected to increase water storage 
capacity by 64 MAF; currently the storage capacity is around 16 MAF (APP 37).  
Similarly, the Government of Sri Lanka has spent Rs. 215 billion between 1980 and 1997 
on irrigation infrastructure development, including the ambitious Mahaweli River (Sri 
Lanka Development Policy Review, 2004).  
 
Land poses another major constraint to the development of South Asian agriculture. Land 
rights are poorly defined. Inefficient land holdings, the inability to use land as collateral 
and underdeveloped land and credit markets discourage private investment in agriculture. 
India is perhaps the only country where land reforms have been implemented 
successfully. In Pakistan, ‘less than half of the land is held by a large number of small 
farmers while the remainder is held by a small number of large landowners’ (Pakistan 
Agriculture Economy and Policy, 2009) reflecting small holdings and a large landless 
rural labor force. Several half-hearted attempts at land reform have yielded unimpressive 
results.  
 
In Sri Lanka, most of the land was state-owned and was later transferred to the 
agricultural laborers by the method of deed registration. Although the land holdings are 
equitable, they cannot be used as collateral and are in most cases too small to allow the 
adoption of efficient farming techniques. Furthermore, the system of deed registration is 
insufficient to guarantee land ownership. People who want to quit farming must also lose 
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the land. This prohibits exit from agriculture into more profitable rural non-farm 
activities.  
 
Infrastructural Development and Agricultural Research 
 
Investment in infrastructure and research is essential to increase productivity of land. 
This includes farm-market roads, telecommunications, better functioning retail and 
wholesale markets and improved seeds.   
 
Given the change in world demand and the increased prices of high value agricultural 
products such as fresh fruits and vegetables, South Asian agriculture needs to diversify 
away from traditional cereal and cash crops into high value added crops. However, many 
high value added crops are more perishable and therefore better rural transport networks 
are needed to attract investment. Improving communications and connectivity is part of 
the future agricultural policy of almost all South Asian countries. The India Development 
Policy Review highlights that non-farm linkages and agro-processing facilities will help 
in crop diversification and will boost international trade in agriculture. Bangladesh’s 
agriculture, which is heavily reliant on paddy needs to diversify into non-rice crops but is 
held back by the lack of cold storage facilities, marketing and quality standards and 
transportation bottlenecks (Bangladesh Development Series 2007).  
 
The recent WTO Sanitary and Phyto-Sanitary (SPS) requirements also call for increased 
investment in improving quality standards. This is also necessitated by the growing use of 
biologically modified, high yielding seeds. In Sri Lanka, initially restrictive SPS 
requirements discouraged farmers from using these varieties. However, the need for 
intensified agriculture that can help maximize production from limited amounts of land, 
led the Government of Sri Lanka to amend their Plant Protection Act in 1999 with 
revised SPS requirements scheduled for 2004. Similarly, Pakistan has also recently set up 
the National Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service (NAPHIS) in order to ensure 
compliance with WTO SPS regulations, which would otherwise restrict trade (Pakistan 
Agriculture and Economy Policy 2009).  
 
Research and extension to promote competitive agriculture has assumed increasing 
significance. High yielding varieties are being used all over South Asia, but recurrent 
problems such as the mutation of pests to counter the immunity of genetically modified 
varieties requires that agriculture research stays abreast of field developments. This will 
require higher expenditure on research; the medium term target is an expenditure of 1-2 
percent of GDP.    
 
Intra Regional Trade 
 
South Asia regional trade in agricultural commodities is a meager 4% of the worldwide 
South Asia trade. India, by far the largest economy of the region, has the most protective 
trade regime. While it is highly diversified in its exports, it is the least diversified in the 
region in its imports. A range of non-tariff barriers, along with a 40% average tariff rate 
on agricultural commodities, severely limit imports from the neighboring countries. A 
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lowering of these trade barriers as envisioned by SAFTA would result in a large increase 
in regional trade in agriculture. 
 
Studies have shown that Pakistan and India can effectively manage their respective food 
security issues if trade in crops like wheat and sugarcane is allowed. In a deficit year, 
India could import wheat from Pakistan and vice versa resulting in stability of supply and 
hence price. Unfortunately, chronic instability in the political relations between the two 
countries has disrupted efforts to achieve the mutually beneficial outcome of improved 
trade flows.      
 
Figure V.5.  Intraregional Trade in Agriculture in South Asia
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VI. Towards Competitive Manufacturing 
 
 
The anemic performance of South Asian manufactures was seen in a series of graphs in 
chapter 3 that showed that manufactures share in the economy was stagnant during a 
period of rapid economic growth. Figure below shows this more strikingly and in vivid 
contrast to the performance of East Asian manufactures.    
 
The State of South Asian Manufacturing 
 
Unimpressive growth  
 
Over three decades between 1968 and 2001, Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand achieved 
remarkable growth in manufacturing value added that increased, respectively, by a factor 
of 40, 27, and 14. This implies a huge transformation of the society in terms of how 
people work, where they live and how they invest in themselves to become productive 
members of the society.  It is this transformation that lies at the core of the East Asia’s 
growth miracle.  
 
South Asian manufacturing, by contrast, was lackluster in the three decades when East 
Asia was galloping away. In Pakistan, manufacturing value added increased by a factor 
of 7, in India by a factor of 6. Value addition in manufacturing in more recent years, 
2001-2007, shows some pick up, Figure VI.2.     
 
Weak International Competitiveness  
 
The evidence on how South Asia positions its manufactures in the world markets is not 
very encouraging. Figure VI.3 shows this. The vertical axis measures the growth in the 
export of product x, worldwide, as a share of total world exports. The horizontal axis 
measures the growth in the export of product x for a country as a share of total world 
export of product x. If the country’s product lies in the right hand upper (the happy) 
quadrant, the country is gaining in international competitiveness. This is because its share 
in the export market for product x is rising at time when worldwide share of the product 
in total world exports is rising. The more products a country has in the happy quadrant 
the stronger its international competitiveness. Figure shows this for India and Pakistan.  
 
In 2007, India had three product groups (the colored blobs representing chemicals, iron 
and steel and pharmaceuticals; the size of the blob measures the product share in 
country’s exports) in the happy quadrant. Together they comprise a fifth of India’s 
exports. Thirty five percent of India’s exports were growing in product categories whose 
share in worldwide exports is falling. This is not desirable since declining world demand 
will require painful adjustment down the road. Another feature of India’s exports is that 
products are diversified as seen in the number of mid to large size blobs representing 
different product groups.  
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Figure  VI.1: Characteristics of Recent Growh IV: South Asia growth not up to East Asia 
standards; slow growth in manufacturing value added 
 
 
Source: Devarajan and Nabi (2006): “Economic Growth in South Asia: Promising, Unequalizing, 
Sustainable?” 
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Pakistan, by comparison, had only a tiny proportion of its exports in the happy quadrant 
i.e. chemicals at 2.6 percent. Although small to begin with, Pakistan’s share in the 
worldwide pharmaceuticals markets was declining even though worldwide demand for 
pharmaceuticals is rising. Thus, the vast majority of Pakistan’s exports are in products 
whose share is declining in the world market. Equally worrying is the fact that Pakistan’s 
exports are dominated by one big (textiles) and one mid size (clothing) while the rest are 
tiny. This shows lack of product differentiation and high concentration in textiles.  
 
International competitiveness indicators for Bangladesh and Sri Lanka (Figures IV.4), 
similar to those of Pakistan, are also not encouraging.                  
 
A more recent approach42, that combines insights from the literature on industrial 
clusters43 and new economic geography, characterizes competitiveness as the country’s 
ability to position itself in world industrial clusters that are dense, since greater density 
allows scale economies in new inter-related activities. The countries located in dense 
clusters enjoy longer and many more opportunities of productivity growth thereby 
pushing economies up the income ladder. This approach allows a fresh look at East 
Asia’s success in transforming itself to a middle-income region. Hausman et al (2007) 
illustrate this for Malaysia. Figure VI.5a shows the Malaysian economy, represented by 
black squares, in 1975 in relation to the three important clusters of dense activity: capital-
intensive industry (e.g. chemicals) in the middle, machinery manufacturing in the 
Northeast and labor intensive (textiles) industry in the Southwest. In 1975 (Fig VI.5a), 
Malaysia was mainly a primary goods exporter located in the sparse periphery areas and 
had little or no presence in any of the dense clusters.  
 
By middle 1980’s, Malaysia was on its way to realizing its development objectives of 
improving cross-ethnic distribution outcomes to gain political stability. It sought to 
achieve this by investing in human capital, pursuing a liberal trade regime and opening 
up to foreign direct investment. The resulting improvement in international 
competitiveness is captured well in Figure VI.5c. Malaysia began to make its presence 
felt in world markets as its exports began to gravitate towards all three clusters of dense 
activity.  
 
This trend continues as Malaysia steadily pursues its development strategy facilitated by 
improved ethnic harmony and political stability. By the year 2000, Malaysia was well-
entrenched in the Northeast machinery manufacturing (mainly electronics) cluster. 
 
Hausman et al (2007) did a similar analysis of evolving competitiveness for one country 
in South Asia region viz., Pakistan. As early as 1975, Pakistan had specialized in labor-
intensive textiles and little has changed since then in terms of cluster location. This lack 
of dynamic competiveness characterizing South Asia is worrisome. 
                                                 
42
 Hausman & Klinger (2007):  The Structure of the Product Space and the Evolution of Comparative 
Advantage, CID Working Paper;  
43
 Hidalgo et al(2007): “The Product Space Conditions the Development of Nations”, Science Volume 317, 
www.sciencemag.org 
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Figure VI.3: Performance of Manufactured Exports 
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Source: WTO Trade Statistics 2009 and IMF DOT statistics 2009 
 
Figure VI.4 
49
 
Source: WTO Trade Statistics 2009 and IMF DOT statistics 2009 
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Figure:VI.5a44
Malaysia 1975
 
Figure: VI.5b 
Malaysia 1985
 
 
 
                                                 
44
 Figure 5&6(a-c) are based on a presentation by Ricardo Hausmann (2009) entitled “Pakistan’s 
competitiveness & comparative advantage: Thinking about the road ahead”. 
 
 75
Figure VI.5c 
Malaysia 2000
 
Figure:  VI.6a  
 
Pakistan 1975
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 Figure:  VI.6b 
 
Pakistan 1985
Figure: VI.6c 
 
Pakistan 2000
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Rigidity in Export Destinations 
 
Export diversification is captured in Figures VI.7a and VI.7b. Being in the happy 
quadrant now implies that a country’s share in the imports of the destination country 
(whose share in total work imports is increasing) are growing. For both India and 
Pakistan, the happy quadrant destination is the UAE with growth rate of 6 and 7% 
respectively in that market. The vast majority of exports are still headed to traditional 
destinations for both India and Pakistan (i.e. the U.S., China, Hong Kong, Germany and 
the U.K). Imports from Pakistan by theses traditional destinations, however, are falling 
compared to India. Similarly, Sri Lanka’s share of imports in the traditional markets is 
also declining. This is a matter of concern since even though the share in world imports 
may be declining, they still account for the largest share of world imports.   
 
 
Failure to Upgrade Technology 
  
The failure to achieve dynamic competitiveness in South Asia is embedded in the failure 
to move up the technology ladder in production systems. Sanjaya Lall (2000) has shown 
this in his insightful analysis of evolving technological intensity in East and South Asian 
economies.  
 
Sanjaya Lall (2000), groups exports in four broad technology categories: resource based 
exports (industrial raw materials), low technology embodying exports and medium and 
high technology embodying exports (Figure VI.8). The period over which technological 
change is assessed is 1981-2000. China, Malaysia and Thailand, representing East Asia 
are compared with Pakistan and India representing South Asia.  
 
In resource based exports category, India increased its share while Pakistan decreased the 
share in keeping with the East Asian economies. In the next category, low technology 
exports, Pakistan increased its share while India and the three East Asian economies 
decreased theirs. In the medium technology category, India’s share decreased while 
Pakistan’s increased slightly. The share of the three East Asian economies, on the other 
hand, increased, Malaysia’s significantly. The high technology group, the one that 
constitutes the ‘big boys club’ in terms of allowing economies of scale and 
competitiveness advantage, India and Pakistan have gained very little in the twenty year 
period. The three East Asian economies, on the other hand, are literally the new kids on 
the block, knocking loudly on the door of the high technology club of industrial 
countries. More recent evidence confirms this structure (Figure VI.9).     
 
 
 Unsatisfactory Employment Creation  
 
An important consequence of the lack luster performance of manufacturing, especially 
manufacturing exports, is that manufacturing job growth in South Asia is unimpressive. 
The East Asian experience is that manufacturing jobs are critical in facilitating the move 
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to higher productivity better paid employment and therefore sustained improvement in 
the living standards of citizens. This has not happened in South Asia. Figure VI. 10 
shows in recent years, employment in manufacturing (proxied by employment in industry 
due to data availability) has stagnated in Pakistan at around 20% of the total labor force 
and declined in India. Bangladesh shows a small increase albeit from a small base. 
 
Two recent papers, one on India and the other on Pakistan, provide fresh evidence on the 
failure of employment generation in the non-agriculture formal sectors of the economy, 
especially in manufacturing.  
 
A careful analysis of the impact of India’s development and reforms on employment in a 
recent paper by T.N. Srinivasan45 shows that despite the state’s dominant role in the 
economy in the first sixty years of India’s independence, and the emphasis on capital 
intensive industry and on small scale industry (via a policy of product reservation), the 
structure of employment in the economy has changed little. This is clearly seen in table 
VI.1x: (Agriculture employed 7% of the workforce in 1977-78 and 66% in 2004-5). The 
paper argues further that the higher growth levels achieved since the liberalization of the 
economy in 1991 was led by the services sector and given unchanged structure of 
employment, the productivity gap between workers in the primary and secondary and 
tertiary levels has increased. While growth in services has brought about a welcome 
reduction in poverty, had the secondary sector also generated enough employment, the 
reduction in poverty would have been even more impressive. Going forward, India needs 
to capture more of the outsourcing in manufacturing than it does currently (i.e. replicate 
in manufacturing the success achieved in the outsourcing of services).    
 
Table VI.1:  Employment in the organized sector in India (millions).  
 1981 1991 2001 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Private sector total (millions) 7.4 7.7 8.7 8.4 8.2 8.5 8.8 
of  which manufacturing  4.5 4.5 5.0 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Public sector total (millions) 15.5 19.1 19.1 18.6 18.2 18.0 18.2 
Of which manufacturing 1.5 1.9 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 
Private and public sector  total 22.9 26.7 27.8 27.0 26.4 26.5 27 
Of which manufacturing 6.0 6.4 6.4 6.0 5.7 5.6 5.6 
Source: MOF (2007,200), Tables 3.1-3.3 Appendix, as cited in T.N. Srinivasan  (2010), “Employment and 
India’s development reforms”, Journal of Comparative Economics  
 
Pakistan’s recent experience of rapid economic growth in 2002-3-2007-8 also shows the 
failure of the non-agriculture formal sector to generate enough employment.  Both male 
and female worker share in formal non-agriculture employment fell between 1999-2000 
and 2007-08. Employment in the informal sector, however, increased much more so for 
male than for female workers.   
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
45
 T. Srinivasan (2010), “Employment and India’s development reforms”, Journal of Comparative 
Economics  
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Table VI.2 : Distribution of workforce by formal/informal sectors and by gender in Pakistan 
(percentages) 
 Male 
1999-2000 
 
2007-08 
Female 
1999-2000 
 
2007-08 
Agriculture 44.3 36.87 72.93 74.98 
Non-agriculture 55.56 63.12 27.14 25.07 
  Formal 19.01 17.15 9.29 6.86 
   Informal 36.55 45.97 17.79 18.22 
  Source: Pakistan Labor Force Survey, various years  
    
 
Figure VI.7a  
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                   Source: UN Comtrade 2009; WTO Trade Statistics 2009 and IMF DOT statistics 2009 
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Figure VI.7b 
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Source: UN Comtrade 2009; WTO Trade Statistics 2009 and IMF DOT statistics 2009 
 
Figure:  VI.8 
 
 
0%  
10%  
20%  
30%  
40%  
50%  
60%  
70%  
80%  
90%  
1981 2000 1981 2000 1981 2000 1981 2000 
Resource 
Based 
Low Technology M ediu m Technology   High  T echnology  
Pakistan  India  C hina  Malaysia   Thailand  
Technology Intensity in M anufactured Exports (%) 
0%  
10%  
20%  
30%  
40%  
50
%  
60%  
70  
8  
90%  
1981 2000  1981  2000  1981  2000  1981  2000  
esource  Based  e l y e i  ec l    i  e l y  
Pakistan   India   C hina  Malaysia   Thailand  
Technology Intensity in Manufactured Exports (% ) 
Fig 10 Technology Intensity in M anufactured Exports 
 
Source: Devarajan and Nabi (2006): “Economic Growth in South Asia: Promising, Unequalizing,   
Sustainable?” 
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Figure VI. 9 
 
Source: World Development Indicators 2008 & 2009 
 
 
Figure VI. 10 
Employment in Industry 
(Percentage of Total Employment)
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Fixing the Policy Framework   
 
What is the policy framework that has resulted in the unimpressive performance of South 
Asian manufacturing, especially manufacturing exports? The discussion in this section 
provides some answers and suggests some remedial measures. 
 
The Exchange Rate 
 
A good starting point for assessing the impact of the policy framework on the 
performance of manufacturing, especially manufacturing exports, is the exchange rate. 
The loss of competitiveness (Dutch disease) associated with remittances has already been 
noted . The argument is that the large and persistent trade gap in South Asian economies 
would imply much lower nominal exchange rates (weaker currencies) in South Asia than 
actually observed. The explanation for high currency values and build up of reserves, 
despite the large trade gap, lies in remittances: remittances result in a much higher 
equilibrium exchange rate than would be the case otherwise.  
 
The solution to the high nominal exchange rate that erodes international competitiveness 
does not lie in policy intervention to devalue the currency, as several East Asian 
economies have done in the past (see the discussion in section 3). A sounder approach 
would be to ensure that the rest of the policy framework does not reinforce the exchange 
rate over valuation effect to erode the incentives for investing in manufacturing. The key 
policies considered are: credit allocation, energy pricing and tax and labor policies.   
 
Credit Allocation 
 
South Asia saw rapid expansion in credit in the period of high remittances and high-
income growth. Banking sector reform that encouraged domestic and international 
private commercial banking helped in successful intermediation of the large volumes of 
remittances. However, the evidence below (Figure VI.11) shows that most of the new 
lending was for consumption. In Sri Lanka, the gap between consumption and industrial 
lending widened considerably in the period 2000-07.  In India, personal loan advances by 
banks have been considerably higher than lending to industry in most recent years. In 
Nepal, the rate of growth of consumption loans has been higher than for production loans. 
Similarly, in Pakistan personal loans now far exceed loans to private enterprises. 
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Figure VI.11            
Trends in Corporate and Consumer Finance in South Asia 
1
 
Source: Various Government Sources46  
 
A more detailed breakdown of lending categories in Pakistan supports the South Asia 
wide lending experience (Figure VI.12). The fastest growth in credit is in the category of 
personal loans. It has outstripped by far lending to private and non-financial public 
enterprises. In conclusion, the reformed banks of South Asia appear to have devoted 
much of their energy in expanding the personal loans portfolio rather than lending to 
private enterprises and industry.    
 
Figure VI.12  
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Source: Banking Statistics of Pakistan, State Bank of Pakistan (2008) 
                                                 
46
 Reserve Bank of India, Annual Reports (2006-07 and 2007-08); Banking Statistics of Pakistan, State 
Bank of Pakistan (2008); Central Bank of Sri Lanka, Annual Report 2007; Nepal Rastra Bank, Economic 
Reports (2004-05, 2006-07) 
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Energy Policy:    
 
Unlike the banks, South Asia’s energy sector is riddled with inefficiencies and is largely 
unreformed. High line losses and reluctance to charge prices that reflect the true cost of 
delivering gas and electricity at the doorstep, have resulted in the energy sector becoming 
a fiscal drag on the state economies in India and the federal economy in Pakistan. Similar 
problems afflict the energy sector in Sri Lanka, Bangladesh and Nepal. The result is poor 
quality of energy and large gaps in coverage throughout South Asia.  
 
Not withstanding the fiscal problems associated with energy, the evidence on energy 
pricing is informative about policy makers’ sector preferences. The top left panel of 
Figure 6.3 shows the price of light fuel in India charged to industry and households. The 
price has been consistently higher for industry compared to households. In pricing 
electricity, top right panel of Figure VI.13 there is similar preference for the household 
consumers compared to industrial units in Pakistan and Sri Lanka and strongly so in 
India. Nepal is the exception with power tariffs are slightly lower for industry than for 
households. Finally, the lower panel shows that electricity tariff have been substantially 
lower for households compared to industry over a longish period.     
        
Figure VI.13 
Energy Pricing in South Asia
1
 
Sources: International Energy Agency (IEA) “Energy Prices and Taxes”, Quarterly Statistics (3rd Quarter) 
2005; Government Statistics for Individual Countries47 
                                                 
47
 
a Privitization of Faisalabad Electric Supply Company: Preliminary Information Memorandum (March 
2006). Local currency rates converted at official exchange rate of Rs 59.51 /1 $ 
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Tax Policies 
 
The policy makers’ preference for the household sector over industry and manufacturing 
persists in the design of tax policies as well. The left panel of Figure VI.14 shows higher 
corporate tax rate in India, Bangladesh and Pakistan (strongly so) compared to the 
personal income tax. Only Sri Lanka shows no particular preference. The right panel 
reinforces this conclusion by comparing the tax structures of India and Pakistan in South 
Asia with that of China and Thailand in East Asia. The latter two clearly show the 
converse preference by policy makers in the successful export oriented economies of the 
East Asia: the corporate tax rate is considerably lower than the personal income tax rate, 
especially in China, the engine of export led growth in the region.      
 
 
Figure VI.14 
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Source: KPMG’s Corporate and Indirect Tax Rate Survey 2008; b) KPMG Individual Tax Rate Survey 
2008; c) National Board of Revenue Bangladesh  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
b Ceylon Electricity Board: Statistical Digest 2005. Local currency rates converted at official exchange rate 
of Rs 100.50 Rs/1 $
c Nepal Electricity Authority: A Year in Review (Fiscal Year 2005/2006). Retail tariffs derived from the 
table on p23. Local currency rates converted at official exchange rate of Rs 71.37 Rs/1 $ 
d
 International Energy Agency: Electricity in India. Local currency rates converted at official exchange rate 
of Rs 44.94 Rs/1 $ 
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Pakistan’s Sectoral Tax Incidence: 
 
Labor Policy 
 
A policy framework that is inclined towards allocating resources more favorably to 
households (consumption) than to industry (investment) spans the labor market as well. 
Various studies have highlighted the large number of labor market regulations that do not 
necessarily work to the advantage of workers but contribute to the high cost of doing 
business for firms. Figure VI.15 below captures the impact of such regulation on 
employment rigidity in several South and East Asian economies.  It is clear that in 
general South Asian firms (in Nepal, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka)  face much more rigid 
employment conditions than do the export oriented East Asian firms (in China and 
Thailand). Employment rigidities restrict firm exit (and therefore firm entry) and thus 
erode competitiveness. The political underpinnings of employment rigidities pose the 
toughest challenges to labor market reforms that seek to raise both firm profitability and 
worker wages.          
 
 
Figure VI.15 
Employment Regulations in South Asia
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Source: World Development Indicators 2008
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Concluding Remarks 
 
The following excerpt for Pakistan’s Dawn newspaper sums up things well.  
 
 
Thursday November 05, 2009 
 
 
Cabinet decision for Punjab, NWFP 
2-day closure for factories, CNG stations 
 
ISLAMABAD, Nov 04: All industrial units and CNG stations will remain closed two days a week on a 
rotation basis in Punjab and the NWFP during winter, according to a gas load management plan approved 
by the federal cabinet on Wednesday. 
 
 
Pakistan faces a critical shortage of natural gas. Rather than use the price mechanism for rationing 
the available gas, policy makers have opted for quantitative rationing imposed on industry and 
commercial use for transportation. Residential consumers will continue to burn gas in inefficient 
residential water and room heaters and cooking ranges since there are no incentives to conserve. 
The stated rationale of course is that poor consumers will be adversely affected if rationing is 
done through the price mechanism. Of course, this can be avoided by adopting a sliding scale 
pricing formula to charge lower price of gas for low consumption. Not taking this route suggests 
that the intent is to protect all consumers and not just the poor consumers. 
 
So, why does manufacturing get a short shrift in South Asia? One reason could be that 
manufacturing received excessive attention in the past (the import-substitution phase of the 
1960’s and the 1970’s) with overvalued exchange rates, tax holidays, high rates of protection via 
penalizing imports duties and subsidized credit. The perception is that manufacturing did not 
deliver in terms of growth and income enhancing employment. So, now that remittances have 
helped build up foreign reserves and strengthened the currencies, why not enjoy higher 
consumption standards directly (rather than via getting better paying manufacturing jobs, which 
was East Asia’s route to development).  
 
This attitude is also the result of export pessimism among policy makers shaped by the view that 
the East Asian tigers and China have saturated the world markets for goods and there is little 
room left for new players. Therefore, it is better to focus on developing the large domestic market 
for goods and focus on services export.  
 
The adverse impact on local economies of the global recession is cited as evidence of the ill-
consequences of globalization and the downside risks of being part of international supply chains.    
 
Textiles manufacturing , of course, receives a lot of policy attention throughout South Asia. Most 
of this, however, is in the form of sector specific exemptions from the standard regime of sales, 
income and trade taxes. Textiles have also received attention in the form of lending targets of 
commercial banks set by the South Asian central banks. With so much attention focused on 
textiles, policy makers might feel that they have done enough for manufacturing. We have seen, 
however, that although this has resulted in growth in one specific sector, it has done little to bring 
about a diversified manufacturing base in South Asia.  
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Political instability and full-blown insurgencies in many South Asian economies may also have 
contributed to a pro-consumption policy stance. Investment in manufacturing is seen to be 
difficult since it entails long gestation periods, reliable logistics and stable policy regimes. These 
are hard to sustain in time of insurgency. Repeated failure to attract investment in manufacturing 
in these settings, and reap the benefits of sustained high productivity and high wage employment 
generation in manufacturing, may have contributed to the pessimism and shaped the policy bias.  
 
These are conjectures suggestive of the need to carry out a thorough analysis of the political 
economy of policy making in South Asia to understand better the factors that have contributed to 
shaping this policy stance and what needs to be done to remove the disincentives faced by South 
Asian manufacturing. 
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Appendix:  Internal Security and its Impact on South Asian Economies 
 
The Deteriorating Internal Security Environment 
  
South Asia has seen a significant increase in internal security problems in the last couple 
of decades. Up to the mid 1990’s (left panel, Figure A.1), even though the number of 
violent incidents was increasing, South Asia was less violence ridden than the rest of the 
world except for a brief peak in 1989-90. This changed in the mid 1990’s since when 
South Asia experienced a sharp increase in violent incidents, well above the rest of the 
world.  
 
In more recent years (right panel, Figure A.1), the insurgency in Iraq and the related 
violence pushed the rest of the world above South Asia, but violent incidents in South 
Asia rose again in 2007-8, largely driven by Pakistan and Sri Lanka who are/were 
fighting their respective insurgencies. Measured in terms of incidents per capita, both 
Pakistan and Sri Lanka have seen much more violence than India and Bangladesh, 
especially in the latter half of this decade. Given this alarming profile of violence, it 
would be reasonable to expect that economic activity suffered. 
 
Figure A.1 
 
Trends in Terrorism Activities 
 
Source: Global Terrorism Database 
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Figure A.2:  
 
 
The sources of violence in South Asia may be summarized as follows (based largely on 
Iyer (2009)48 but with author’s supplementary comments): 
 
India 
 
- The separatist movements in the North-eastern states (Assam, Manipur, Nagaland, Tri            
pura) and in Kashmir in the Northwest;  
- Violence perpetrated by the Naxalites in many states (in 2007, 194 districts and 18         
states had Naxalite activity) focused especially on issues of land distribution;  
- Terrorist activity in the cities (such as the bombings in Mumbai, Hyderabad, 
Ahmedabad, Jaipur and Bangalore) which Iyer ascribes to fundamentalist Islamic 
groups 
- Communal violence especially against Muslims in Gujrat and Mumbai 
     
 
Pakistan 
 
- Terrorist activity arising from the insurgency in the Federally Administered Tribal            
Areas (FATA) and their sympathizers in the Northern districts of NWFP province but 
also in other parts of the country 
-  The separatist movement in Baluchistan 
 
                                                 
48
 Iyer, Lakshmi, “The Bloody Millenium: Internal Conflict in South Asia”,  January 2009, Working paper 
09-086, Harvard Business School. 
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Nepal 
 
 - Nepal-Maoist led ‘peoples war’ unleashed in the Western districts initially but later     
spread to the whole country.        
 
Sri Lanka 
 
-  The armed campaign by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) for a separate 
homeland that began in the 1980’s; recent escalation in this may have finally brought 
this to a close. 
   
Bangladesh 
 
- Rising terrorist incidents perpetrated by Islamic fundamentalist and by separatist groups 
in the Chittagong hills 
 
 
Internal Security and the Economy 
 
The economic causes of terrorist activity in South Asia have been analyzed elsewhere49. 
There has been an escalation of terrorist activity throughout South Asia but especially so 
in recent years in Pakistan and Sri Lanka. Reported incidents of terrorist activity per 
capita were 0.7 per and 0.6 per million in Bangladesh and India respectively in 1998.  In 
2007, they increased to 0.9 per million in India but doubled to 1.4 per million in 
Bangladesh. Pakistan, with its raging insurgency in the Northwest and Sri Lanka, with an 
escalation in incidents related to the civil war in the Northeast, saw dramatic increase in 
terrorist activity. In Pakistan, such violence shot up by a factor of 8 from 0.3 per 100,000 
persons in 1998 to 2.4 in 2007. In Sri Lanka, the increase in the same period was from 0.8 
per 100,000 to 1.8. The scale of increase in fatalities was similar.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
49
  Iyer (2009) 
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Figure A.3   
 
 
 
 
 
 
Causes of Violent Conflict 
  
The relationship between systemic violence and the economic activity has been examined 
in several countries. It is estimated that South Asian regions that are lagging in economic 
development experience more than three times the number of terrorist incidents per capita 
compared to leading regions, and almost twice as many people died in the lagging 
regions compared to the leading region as a result of such violence. This difference in 
violent incidents between lagging and leading regions holds across countries (i.e Nepal 
and Afghanistan are lagging countries as a whole) but also within countries (the lagging 
regions of Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh experience more violence than the 
respective leading regions).  
 
It may be argued that social factors such as high incidence of poverty and  incidence of 
land disputes (because of poor property rights) and high concentration of socially 
disadvantaged groups (scheduled castes etc) would also be contributing factors to 
violence. However, disaggregated district level evidence from Nepal and India gives a 
mixed picture. Districts with high incidence of poverty do experience higher violence 
(which is consistent with the findings reported in several studies that root violence in 
poverty (for example, Collier and Hoeffler, 200450; Fearon and Laitin, 200351) but land 
                                                 
50
 Collier, Paul and Anke Hoeffler (2004), “Greed and grievance in civil war”, Oxford Economic papers,  
56, 563-595. 
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disputes and social disadvantages of caste are not correlated with higher incidence of 
violence.  
 
Among the causes of violent incidents in South Asia, the external environment also 
appears to matter. The escalation in violent activity from 1998 to 2007, especially in 
Afghanistan and the Pashtun belt of Pakistan (Northwest region) can be ascribed to the 
sharp deterioration in the global environment. This is particularly true for Pakistan that 
has borne the brunt of the Pashtun insurgency after NATO’s invasion of Afghanistan. US 
led war on Iraq since 2002, and how it is perceived in Afghanistan and Pakistan may 
have further added to the resentment against the US. This is especially true in Pakistan 
where the government and the armed forces are seen by certain sections of the society to 
be allied with the US against local interests.  
 
 
Impact of Violence on Economic Activity     
 
The Colombian experience with generalized violence and deterioration in law and order 
due to drugs trafficking has been analyzed recently (Cardenas and Rozo, 2008)52. There 
was a structural downturn in economic growth starting 1979 when trade in drugs and the 
associated violent crime began to increase sharply. This lowered total factor productivity 
and economic growth was lowered by as much as 2 percentage points of GDP per annum.  
 
Mexico has also experienced an escalation of drugs-related extreme violence in recent 
years. Indeed, it has been ranked close to Pakistan as the country most likely to fail 
because of growing violence. The impact of this escalation in violence on Mexico’s 
economy appears to be less consequential53.     
 
In South Asia, Sri Lanka’s economy has been long exposed to violent activity because of 
the war on LTTE.  Several studies have been conducted to estimate the impact on various 
aspects of economic activity. The overall economic impact estimated by the Central Bank 
of Sri Lanka is estimated at around 2 percentage points of GDP per annum (similar to 
Columbia’s experience). 
 
For Pakistan, the cost of the war on terror has been estimated in some detail54. The direct 
costs include value of human lives lost or of injuries, value of property or infrastructure 
destroyed or damaged and enhanced spending on defense, policing and private security. 
The indirect costs include costs to local economies (in terms of slow down of GDP 
growth, especially in NWFP and FATA) the cost of internally displaced persons and the 
cost of higher risk perception and uncertainty (that affects private investment, stock 
                                                                                                                                                 
51
 Fearon James and David laitin (2003), “Ethnicity, insurgency and civil war”, American Political Science 
Review 97, 75-90. 
52
 Cardenas, Maurocio and Sandra Rozo, “Does Crime Lower Growth? Evidence from Colombia”, 
Commission on Growth and Development, 2008, Working Paper No. 30. The World Bank, Washington 
DC. 
53
 “Despite Violence, Mexican Economy Pushes on.” Frontier Outlook, Jan 9th, 2010.  
54
 Institute of Public Policy, “State of the Economy: Emerging from the Crisis”, 2009, Second Annual 
Report, Beaconhouse National University, Lahore. 
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market capitalization, travel and tourism, hotel occupancy and insurance).  The direct 
cost  of terrorism in 2007-8 (since 2002-3) is estimated at Rs 150 billion and the indirect 
cost at Rs 230 billion. The total cost of terrorism in 2007-8 is estimated at Rs 380 billion 
or US 47 billion.   
 
Terrorism’s impact on South Asian economies can also be analyzed by examining the 
trends in foreign direct investment and export performances. If FDI affects risk 
perception negatively and raises uncertainty, foreign investors are likely to shy away.  
(The direct cost estimates for Pakistan reported above factor this in explicitly). Figure 
A.4 shows a declining trend in FDI as terrorist activity rises. Figure A.5 shows that 
export performance is also negatively correlated with heightened terrorism. In Pakistan 
for example, buyer representatives in the textiles sector do not travel to the country to 
place orders and/or ensure quality. This shows up in poor export performance.      
 
One form of foreign funds that actually increase with rise in terrorist activity is 
remittances (Figure A.6). This is because violent incidents reduce economic activity in 
the country thereby curtailing income generating possibilities. This lowers household 
income that, in turn, may trigger higher savings remitted back to the family from family 
members working abroad. In Pakistan, remittances peaked during heightened terrorist 
activity also because there was a clamp down on informal remittance channels that were 
feared to be potential funding sources for terrorists. Furthermore, remittances from the 
US increased sharply because Pakistani migrants in the US, facing uncertainty there 
following September 11 attacks, increased remittances to make a home in Pakistan in 
case things in the US get really bad for them.  
 
Figure A.4: Terrorism Activity and FDI flows  
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Source: Global Terrorism Database and WDI 2009 
 
Figure A.5: Terrorism Incidents and Export Growth 
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      Source: Global Terrorism Database and WDI 20 
 
Figure A.6:  Terrorism Incidents and Remittances  
Terrorism Incidents and Remittances
 
      Source: Global Terrorism Database and WDI 2009 
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Table A. 1 Remittances to Pakistan by country, pre and post  Sept 11 2001.  
Source:  State Bank of Pakistan, Annual reports 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A.6: Remittances received by Pakistan  
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Worker 
Remittances 
by Country 
(Million US$) 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Totals 
for 
2000-
2009 
USA 80 134.8 779 1237.5 1225.1 1294 1242 1460 1760 1740 10952.4 
UK 73.3 81.4 151.9 273.8 333.9 372 439 430 460 610 3225.3 
SAUDI ARABIA 309.9 304.4 376.3 580.8 565.3 627 750 1024 1250 1560 7347.7 
UAE 147.8 190 469.5 837.9 597.5 713 716 866 1090 1690 7317.7 
Other Gulf 
Countries 224.3 198.8 224.3 474 451.5 512 597 757 980 1200 5618.9 
Others 78.3 112.2 339.8 786.8 652.9 634 843 954 910 1020 6331 
TOTAL 913.6 1021.6 2340.8 4190.8 3826.2 4152 4587 5491 6450 7820 40793 
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Figure A.7: Remittances to Pakistan by source country (US$ millions) 
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Figure A.8: Remittances source country share (percentages)  
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